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The disfavored status within international law of unilateral
state-based regulations that target extraterritorial actors arises
from the inherent challenges such actions represent to state sov-
ereignty. In the context of the Internet, the complexity of choice-
of-law analysis is heightened: regulations imposed by one state
have the potential to effectively block communications to citizens
of all states and undermine the conflicting regulatory aims of
neighboring states. Early legal commentators built upon this
cascading chilling effect of state-based regulation to proclaim
both the futility and illegitimacy of state-based action in the
online environment. Subsequent scholars have demonstrated the
commensurability of state-based online regulation and the exist-
ing framework of international jurisdiction and choice-of-law
analysis. However, having solved the jurisdictional puzzle and
established the legitimacy of extraterritorial regulatory re-
sponses to local harm that originates abroad, these
commentators have either left untouched or downplayed the im-
pact of unilateral regulations in a networked environment.
According to their assessments, the "spillover" impact of unilat-
eral cyberspace regulation will not differ significantly from the
impact of competing claims to regulate a single activity in real
space. In apparent support for this position, recent technological
developments that promise to geographically inscribe borders
onto the Internet have been proclaimed as the harbinger of full-
fledged state-based regulation and the end of the theoretical de-
bate. This Article challenges the now-conventional assertion that
in an era of bordering technologies the impact of unilateral
regulatory moves in the online world can be effectively cabined.
The Article utilizes a series of extraterritorial disputes to assess
the increasing willingness of courts and states to regulate online
activities and content across borders. In particular, it builds on
the decision by a French court in the case of LICRA v. Yahoo!,
which sought to "solve" the problem of offensive hate speech by
mandating the use offiltering technologies that would block the
transmission of content into the forum state. Following Yahoo!, a
recent spate of extraterritorial disputes adjudicated by foreign
courts over expressive regulation have adapted the Yahoo! tem-
plate of effects-based jurisdiction as a means of maintaining
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national cultural and informational integrity. These cases both
usher in and help create a new reality; responding to the com-
mercial availability of geo-location technologies, they call for
the implementation of filtering tools for the compliance of na-
tional content regulation. First, the Article reads Yahoo! and its
progeny as the embodiment of an emergent European regulatory
methodology, emphasizing human rights and regionalism. Sec-
ond, it situates this methodology as a response to the perceived
indirect unilateralism represented by the technical and informa-
tional hegemony of the United States from the early history of
cyberspace through the 1990s. Through unilateral gestures,
European states are rightfully staking a claim for the global me-
dium to reflect heterogeneous cultural and technical values.
The Article then adapts a dynamic model of regulatory impact to
elicit a reconsideration of the optimism accorded the future
status of unilateral regulations. Such a model highlights the re-
cursive nature of regulatory impact in a digitally networked
globe-states can enter at either the level of law or technology
to impact the system and establish rules for all online actors.
The online regulatory framework represents a uniquely playable
system, whereby states are just as likely to find their own regula-
tory goals stifled by the process of unilateral regulation as they
are likely to see them fulfilled. Hence, it is in the interest not
only of the international system, but also of individual states
themselves, to adapt regulatory strategies of cooperation, such
as international harmonization and national self-enforcement.
Ultimately, an interconnected network is not an American inter-
est, but a global interest; a geo-politically divided Internet
would facilitate national governance, but at the cost of the World
Wide Web.
INTRODUCTION
The case of LICRA v. Yahoo! captured the attention of the interna-
tional community by putting a new spin on the jurisdictional
uncertainties arising from the extraterritorial regulation of speech; rais-
ing the question of which nation, if any, has the power to regulate speech
on the Internet?' The American company, Yahoo!, owner of the world's
1. UEJF et LICRA v. Yahoo! Inc. et Yahoo France, T. G. I. Paris, May 22, 2000, N- RG:
00/05308, obs. C.Bensoam & J.Gomez, translation available at, http://www.lapres.net/html/
yahen.html (last visited Apr. 3, 2003).
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most popular search engine and web directory, was sued by anti-hate
activists in France for violating a national law that prohibits the exhibi-
tion of Nazi memorabilia. While such displays are illegal in France, they
are constitutionally protected in the United States under the First
Amendment. The French court reasoned that because the offensive mate-
rials were accessible on-line in France, the court could assert jurisdiction
over Yahoo! in the U.S. for non-compliance with its domestic hate
speech statutes. Having found Yahoo! liable, the French court ordered
Yahoo! to filter for French users the display of Nazi memorabilia and
images on Yahoo! auction sites hosted in the United States. Confronting
the problem of offensive speech transmitted through a seamless commu-
nications medium, the Yahoo! case is part of a growing trend toward the
imposition of geographical lines and locations-virtual borders-onto
cyberspace.
Contrary to the wishes of American civil libertarians, free speech
advocates and a characteristically libertarian technological community,
the Yahoo! decision both ushers in and helps create a new reality; re-
sponding to the commercial availability of geo-location technologies, the
decision calls for the implementation of filtering tools to ensure compli-
ance with national content regulation. In this respect, it marked the
transition in public consciousness of the Internet from a technology that
reflected an American bias toward the open flow of information and free
market forces, to one that must increasingly take into account divergent
governmental approaches to Internet regulation. This "international de-
mocratization' 2 of the Internet brings with it new challenges for
international law and policy.
In the context of a borderless medium, national regulation presents a
unique problem for choice of law: regulations imposed by one state
would effectively block communications to all. Within such a frame-
work, regulations initiated in one state that conflict with the regulatory
goal of another nation could be said to have unilateral impact.3 In theory,
zoning the Internet could minimize the harm of communications in for-
eign states without necessitating that publishers alter their content
2. Joel R. Reidenberg, Yahoo and Democracy on the Internet, 42 JURIMETRICS J. 261
(2002).
3. The disfavored status within international law of unilateral state-based regulations
that target extraterritorial actors arises from the inherent challenges such actions represent to
state sovereignty. As distinguished from a narrow understanding of unilateralism as "action
against an established multilateral order," the broader definition applicable in the context of
the Internet is a "concern we might have when one nation acts to encode its values in a manner
that transmits them as behavioral constraints on another nation that either does not share these
views, or at the least does not share the determination that they should act as firm behavioral
constraints." Yochai Benkler, Internet Regulation: A Case Study in the Problem of Unilateral-
ism, 11 EJIL 171, 172 (2000).
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locally. Unilateral regulations that either directly or indirectly call for the
creation of "virtual borders" would, thus, appear to resolve debates over
such conflict of laws by mapping territorial boundaries onto the on-line
world, constraining the regulatory "spillover" impact of non-universal
national edicts. In turn, this could afford greater regulatory certainty for
on-line publishers, provide courts with the knowledge that theirs is the
appropriate forum, and ensure legislatures that their actions will reflect
and impact only their own electorate. The Yahoo! decision suggests that
courts and regulators have embraced this logic and are emboldened by
the power of technological tools to enhance local values. Decisions fol-
lowing Yahoo! by other national courts demonstrate that the prior
reluctance of states to extraterritorially regulate on-line actors and activi-
ties has been overtaken by a new readiness to extend jurisdictional
reach.'
In this article, I analyze, in light of recent technological develop-
ments that make it possible for Internet publishers to control the
geographic flow of content, the application of unilateral national regula-
tions from the perspective of allocating international regulatory power. I
build on scholarship that acknowledges the susceptibility of the on-line
world to conventional legal rules, and then ask what architectural net-
work decisions are best for the international system. Given the
disfavored place of unilateralism within international law, the questions
to address are: Will virtual borders eliminate concerns about unilateral
national regulations on the Internet? Will they, in fact, obviate unilateral
regulations by eliminating border-shattering offenses? Or, can we under-
stand unilateral regulations that either directly or indirectly necessitate
the use of bordering technology as themselves lying within the ambit of
concern for international law? How, ultimately, can states take advantage
of the commercial and expressive capacities of a global network, while
at the same time protecting local values?
We lie at a transition point in the technological evolution of the
Internet. Technologists will no longer be able to ignore national values in
developing the technical architecture of cyberspace. At the same time,
the value of the Internet as a global communications medium derives
from its ability to lower the barriers of creation and exchange, and to
facilitate the distribution of expression throughout the world. A fully or
4. Needless to say, the promotion of geographical filtering tools need not be direct, but
can be achieved indirectly through the creation or application of regulations that necessitate
their use by imposing a significant cost on cross-border harms.
5. See Michael A. Geist, Is There a There There? Toward Greater Certainty for Internet
Jurisdiction, 16 BERK. TECH. L.J. 1345 (2001); Associated Press, Internet Extends Legal
Reach of National Governments, July 21, 2002 (describing the jurisdictional uncertainty faced
by U.S. companies and content providers, following recent decisions by foreign courts).
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substantially bordered Internet would nullify those attributes that render
the Internet an open, decentralized, and arguably democratic network.
Given that the network remains in its relative infancy, in my view, na-
tions have a collective interest in not establishing unwarranted
roadblocks that would serve to undermine the evolution of the medium.6
The question, then, is how to create a networked environment that util-
izes technological methods to respect the rights of sovereign nations,
while upholding the unique nature of the Internet as a forum for informa-
tional and cultural exchange.
While initial debates regarding this issue focused primarily on the
efficacy and legitimacy of state-based regulation, it is only once we ac-
knowledge that national regulation is both possible and legitimate that
we can begin to consider its impact.7 Thus, while ardent free speech ad-
vocates may argue against regulation per se, I suggest that only by
acknowledging the validity of recourse to unilateral regulations as the
expression of political will can we begin an informed dialogue over the
future shape of Internet law and policy.8 In particular, it is only when we
inspect the motivation that lies behind extraterritorial gestures that we
can respond to their application and define the proper jurisdictional
scope of national laws-the predominant questions with which the inter-
national regulatory system of the on-line world must now be concerned.
In Part II, I outline the descriptive and normative claims made
against state-based Internet regulation and, in particular, unilateral regu-
lation aimed at Internet content originating abroad but causing local
harm. In short, first-generation Internet critics argued that the Internet's
lack of territoriality effectively immunized it from state-based regulation
of this kind. Second, they argued that due to the inability of content pro-
viders to control the flow of information, the inevitable regulatory
spillover impact on other states made state-based actions illegitimate. In
presenting the counterarguments to that position, I discuss the various
technological developments that are in the process of introducing geo-
graphic lines and borders onto the borderless Internet. I then examine the
6. See Catherine P. Heaven, Note, A Proposal for Removing Road Blocks from the In-
formation Superhighway by Using an Integrated International Approach to Internet
Jurisdiction, 10 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 373 (2001).
7. In this spirit, Sanjay Mody urges critics who bemoan the illegitimacy of national
based cyberspace regulations to "spend less time disputing the legitimacy of regulation and
more time thinking about its effects." Sanjay S. Mody, Note, National Cyberspace Regulation:
Unbundling the Concept of Jurisdiction, 37 STAN. J. INT'L L. 365, 366 (2001).
8. See Pierre-Marie Dupuy, The Place and Role of Unilateralism in Contemporary In-
ternational Law 11 EJIL 19, 20 (2000) ("By contrast with treaty actions, unilateral acts
express the will of only one subject of law (individual unilateral acts) or a single group of
subjects together in a collective body, generally itself endowed with legal personality (collec-
tive unilateral acts).... Their proper legal nature cannot be doubted.").
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work of scholars who defend national or unilateral regulation on the
Internet. The proponents of state-based regulation build on the proposi-
tion that customary international law affirms the ability of states to
enforce laws extraterritorially in response to local harms. More impor-
tantly, from this point of view, the spillover impact of unilateral
regulations in cyberspace is no different from that of real-world regula-
tory conflicts and will threaten neither the development nor evolution of
the medium.
In Part III, I apply this backdrop to the jurisdictional conflict of the
Yahoo! case. I use Yahoo! as a case study for the conflict between tech-
nology and values, and, in particular, the difficulties of regulating speech
carried across an interdependent global medium My analysis of Yahoo!
and similar disputes over national speech regulation demonstrates an
increasing European dissatisfaction with the overly permissive free mar-
ket approach of the United States to on-line content regulation-a
dissatisfaction expressed through unilateral regulatory moves. Yahoo!
demonstrates that state-based actions of this kind will in turn force the
U.S.-and more specifically, U.S. companies with global reach-to take
into account divergent national values.9
Having established the French court's decision as a lawful response
to perceived local harm, I examine the consequences of this specific uni-
lateral action. If the framework of international jurisdiction seeks to
"systematically resolve conflicts [of political power] by allocating to
particular states the competence to make or apply law to particular per-
sons, things or events that are, simultaneously or sequentially, claimed
by or subject to the control of two or more states,"' does the Yahoo! de-
cision meet that challenge and adequately take into account the interests
of the international system? I find that, first, Yahoo!'s effects-based ju-
risdictional analysis sets a destabilizing precedent for the international
system and, second, that the Yahoo! court's attempt to take the interna-
tional system into account through the technological "fix" of geographic
filtering should itself be understood as a unilateral regulatory move.
In support of these conclusions and so as to better assess the impact
of unilateral speech regulations, in Part IV, I examine several decisions
9. I have chosen to focus primarily on the template of national speech regulation be-
cause it provides a particularly evocative model for analyzing the localized regulation of a
global medium. In particular, due to the centrality of expressive regulation in defining the
identity of regional communities, there exists great variance across cultures with regard to the
proper contours of "free" speech. While it raises many of the same dynamics as other contem-
porary debates about Internet regulation, e.g., privacy, conflicts over expressive regulation
present a more intractable problem, given the understandable resistance of states to forfeit
their regulatory goals.
10. W. Michael Reisman, Introduction to JURISDICTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, at xi
(W. Michael Reisman ed., 1999).
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by national courts following Yahoo! that have adopted a similar approach
to on-line speech regulation. Each court has used the across-border reach
of an effects-based test to arrive at a finding of jurisdiction based on the
visible impact of on-line content. In Part V, I read these decisions as re-
assertions of local values in response to a global communications
medium. In particular, I suggest that they are manifestations of a Euro-
pean regulatory methodology for the on-line world, focused on
regionalism and an expansive consideration of human rights.
Understanding the motivation behind the trend toward effects-based
jurisdiction, however, does not itself address the efficacy or efficiency of
unilateral regulation. Thus, in Part VI, I utilize Yochai Benkler's model
of dynamic regulatory impact to show that, in an era of virtual borders,
unilateral regulations will continue to impact other nations extraterritori-
ally and should remain a concern of the international community.
Benkler's layered approach to communications networks stresses the
interdependent and playable nature of a digitally networked globe. By
acknowledging the mutually implicated nature of regulatory efforts at
the intersection of law and technology, he highlights the need to favor a
principle of cooperation, as contrasted to the broad application of nation-
based rulemaking.
In conclusion, I suggest what such a principle of cooperation might
entail by outlining tentative regulatory recommendations for states that
seek to protect themselves from on-line harm. I offer an approach that
seeks to be responsive to the concerns of local values, as well as to the
distribution of the relative competency of states to make and apply their
own law. First, I suggest that the preferred means of resolving on-line
regulatory conflict should be a transition toward greater global harmoniza-
tion and supranational decision-making. Undoubtedly, such cooperative
decision-making is likely to implicate traditional difficulties of collective
action. In matters such as transnational commercial exchange, however,
the shared interest of nations suggests the possibility of their working
together toward substantive agreements. In other areas, nations are likely
to move toward a jurisdictional quid-pro-quo, wherein states will recip-
rocally assist each other in order to facilitate their own regulatory goals.
With regard to contested regulatory matters, such as politically
sensitive subject-matter disputes, the abiding significance of national and
regional norms coupled with the discretionary nature of international
comity, suggests that nations are unlikely to reach the consensus necessary
for collaborative action. In such instances, given the ineffectiveness and
destabilizing impact of extraterritorial enforcement on the international
system, states should soften unilateral actions. This will not, however,
leave states without recourse. Ultimately, considerations of cooperation
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within the international system favor a methodology of national self-
regulation and the use of emergent technical solutions. Rather than attempt
direct unilateral actions states should utilize media-specific techniques,
such as filtering at the level of local Internet Service Providers (ISPs) and
traditional enforcement mechanisms to resolve national concerns within
their own borders. In an era of jurisdictional uncertainty initiated by new
technologies, a technical solution arises which is less restrictive and
intrusive than uncertain and inefficient judicially crafted case-specific
remedies.
I. A SHORT HISTORY OF THE INTERNET REGULATION DEBATE
Arguments over the application of territorial-based expressive regu-
lation to cyberspace have mirrored debates in other areas of cyberlaw,
wherein the illusion of absolute free reign has been gradually displaced
by the recognition that cyberspace can be shaped to condition and con-
trol citizens' behavior." The theoretical backdrop of the Internet
regulation debate has shifted towards the recognition that changes in the
architecture of the Net make state-based regulation a reality. As the
Internet has shown itself to be amenable to geographic regulation and
hence nation-specific law, states are becoming increasingly confident in
applying their existing and cyberspace-specific laws to the global me-
dium.' 2 At the same time, many commentators in the U.S. and in the
technological community manifest an ongoing commitment to an earlier
vision of the Internet and, as such, continue to express apprehension re-
garding the application of nation-specific laws to cyberspace.
A. The "Regulation Critics" and the Borderless Net
At first glance, the seemingly borderless, transnational scope of the
Internet was thought to have made geography and traditional territorial-
based regulation obsolete. First-generation Internet critics-those who
might be termed "regulation critics" or "Internet separatists""-
embraced a libertarian ethos disfavoring governmental regulation. In its
most radical strain, these proponents conceived of the technological
landscape of the Internet as a distinct sovereign space. We can
11. In a parallel current, critics of recent developments in the law of intellectual property
have cautioned against the capacity for digital technologies to expand the scope of intellectual
property rights in favor of a content owner's ability to control all uses of their works. See, e.g.,
LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE (1999).
12. See The Internet's New Borders, THE ECONOMIST, Aug. 9, 2001.
13. I adopt the term "Internet Separatists" from Joel Reidenberg, see Reidenberg The
Yahoo! Case, supra note 2, and the term "Regulation Critics" from Jack Goldsmith, see Jack
Goldsmith, Against Cyberanarchy, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1199 (1998).
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distinguish between the descriptive and normative claims underlying this
vision: first, the overbold assertion that state-based regulations of
cyberspace are futile and, second, the more legalistic claim that
unilateral state-based actions applied to a global medium represent
illegitimate uses of a sovereign state's power.14
1. A Medium Both Everywhere and Nowhere
Unlike prior media, the Internet was designed to be decentralized,
interactive, and global in scope. These qualities led initial commentators
to focus on the Internet's ability to cross borders, break down real-world
barriers, and destroy distance. If cyberspace is a virtual universe of pure
data unmoored to the real world, conventional regulation, it is argued, is
a technical impossibility. This argument is rooted on several primary
assumptions about the nature of this new communications media-in
particular, the underlying geographic indeterminacy of the network
architecture. As initially designed, Internet Protocol (IP) addresses did
not necessarily correlate with physical location; for reasons of efficiency
and security, the network was designed so as not to permit the flow of
geographical information. As a result, generally speaking to this day,
information that appears on the World Wide Web may be viewed
anywhere in the world.
Given these technical conditions, the "regulation critics" assert that
nations are powerless to control the flow of information across their bor-
ders. The descriptive argument takes literally the metaphor of the
Internet as a "borderless medium," and builds upon the characteristic
nature of on-line activities as existing "everywhere, nowhere in particu-
lar, and only on the Net."'5 Inevitably, electronic communications, it is
said, "play havoc with geographic boundaries."'
6
These opponents of regulation argue that because the Internet is by
definition impervious to the real-space laws that govern traditional geo-
graphic boundaries, attempts by nations to control on-line behavior
would be futile. Because "individual electrons can easily, and without
realistic prospect of detection, 'enter' any sovereign territory," the argu-
ment goes, controlling the flow of electronic information across borders
is impossible.'7 While nations might attempt to control users, "the deter-
mined seeker of prohibited comimunication can simply reconfigure his
14. David R. Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders: The Rise of Law in Cyberspace,
48 STAN. L. REV. 1367 (1996).
15. Id. at 1375.
16. Id. at 1367. See also James Boyle, Foucault in Cyberspace: Surveillance, Sovereignty,
and Hardwired Censors, 66 UNIV. OF CIN. L. REV. 177, 178 (1997).
17. Johnson & Post, supra note 14, at 1372.
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connection," to receive the prohibited content from a server located in a
more permissive region.'8
While this description of the Internet stems from a time when the
network was simpler than it is now, simplicity had its virtues. Many
commentators have equated the open and free flow of on-line informa-
tion with the rapid growth and development of the network.' 9 The
underlying simplicity and neutrality of the Internet's infrastructure were
critical design features that embodied the network's defining attributes.
As a technical approach, these characteristics are articulated as the "end-
to-end" principle; a decentralized design model, which dictates that the
network's intelligence, i.e. decision-making and processing power, are
restricted to its endpoints.' Through the use of common and open proto-
cols, the type, be it email or WebPages, and the content of information,
be it a personal message or copyrighted materials, is exchanged in an
unmediated manner between users without agreement or permission by a
central party.
Legal and technical commentators have convincingly argued that the
Internet's success as an egalitarian communications medium and its ca-
pacity for innovation stem from its construction as a medium with
relatively few rules and lack of authority.2' By treating all parties and
communications alike, unlike the centralized structure of mass media,
the Internet provides content providers with the capacity to develop and
new ways to organize and structure communications. The use of open
protocols enables creators to experiment in the development and imple-
mentation of applications for the network unimpeded. By not
discriminating among forms of content, the network's openness permits
18. Id. at 1374. Typically, an Internet user can use an overseas proxy server to circumvent
on-line blacklists and filtering mechanisms.
19. See, e.g., David Post, Of Black Holes and Decentralized Law-Making in Cyberspace,
2 VAND. J. ENT. L. & PRAC. 70, 73-74 (2000) ("Could [the Internet] have been built any other
way? My instinct is that it could not have, that only an 'authority-free' process... could have
constructed this system, that no one with the authority to build the Internet could have done
so.").
20. See J. H. Saltzer, D. P. Reed, and D. D. Clark, End-to-End Arguments in System De-
sign, 2 ACM TRANSACTIONS IN COMPUTER SYSTEMS 277-88 (Nov. 1984).
21. Communications theorists Lawrence Lessig and Yochai Benkler are among those who
have refashioned the design principles of the original network as political principles rooted on
equality of expressive and commercial opportunity. Their respective projects, however, pivot
on distinct public values; where the enhancement of autonomy lies at the heart of Benkler's
analysis of the networked environment, Lessig's work embodies a parallel preoccupation with
fostering technical innovation. See, e.g., LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS (2001);
Yochai Benkler, From Consumers to Users: Shifting the Deeper Structures of Regulation To-
wards Sustainable Commons and User Access, 52 FED. COMM. L.J. 561, 563 (2000) (arguing
that we should "fashion[] regulatory policies that make access to and use of [informational]
resources equally and ubiquitously available to all users of the network:' rather than concen-
trating control over such resources).
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speakers both large and small to communicate with relative parity. Criti-
cally, these characteristics benefit from the interconnected nature of the
network-its capacity to bring large populations of like-minded persons
together within an interactive forum. As the economic theory of network
effects instructs us, the Internet, like the telephone system before it, in-
creases in economic and social value as more people connect to it." As
the positive benefits of the Internet accrue with heightened connectivity,
in assessing the impact of regulatory efforts that seek to alter the Inter-
net's underlying architecture, "interconnectivity is an important goal that
should not be sacrificed lightly."23
That said, political and technological developments make clear that
deviation from the above-described open and neutral model is inevitable.
There are both valid political and commercial reasons for incorporating
complexity into the network 4 For one, despite its benefits, the openness
of the network makes users vulnerable to unwanted electronic communi-
cations and susceptible to security holes that exploit the interconnected
nature of individual users. While security can be achieved through tech-
nological tools implemented at the user-end, it would no doubt be more
cost-efficient and hassle-free to introduce filtering services that monitor
content transmitted to users or to zone the Internet into smaller entrusted
and encrypted areas. Bearing in mind the benefits of innovation and the
speech-empowering qualities of new communications media, however,
we must engage cautiously as we incorporate additions onto the net-
work.2 A balanced approach would retain some measure of the original
network's simplicity and lack of structure, and aspire toward alternatives
that do not needlessly fragment on-line users and their communities.
22. See generally A. Douglas Melamed, Does Regulation Promote Efficiency in Network
Industries: Network Industries and Anti-trust, 23 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 147 (1999) (offer-
ing a general discussion of network effects and the role of law in the context of networked
industries).
23. Neal Kumar Katyal, Criminal Law in Cyberspace, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1003, 1007
(2001).
24. For a discussion of the variety of developments challenging the end-to-end open na-
ture of the network, see Marjory Blumenthal & David Clark, Rethinking the Design of the
Internet: The End-to-End Arguments vs. the Brave New World 1 ACM TRANSACTIONS ON
INTERNET TECHNOLOGY 70-109 (Aug. 2001). For an argument advancing the preservation of
the Internet's original values in light of this transition, see Mark A. Lemley & Lawrence Les-
sig, The End of End-to-End: Preserving the Architecture of the Internet in the Broadband Era,
48 UCLA L. REV. 925 (2001).
25. See, e.g., Jonathan Zittrain, Can the Internet Survive Filtering?, CNET NEWS.COM,
July 23, 2002 at http://news.com.com/2010-1071-945690.html (last visited Apr. 3, 2003) (dis-
cussing the need for heightened scrutiny and public dialogue as states and commercial entities
begin to rely upon intermediaries in filtering online transmissions).
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2. The Claim of Cyber-Sovereignty
Beyond proclaiming national regulations an exercise in futility, the
"regulation critics" build on the geographic indeterminacy of the net-
work to embrace normative claims regarding the illegitimacy of
unilateral state-based action. In the extreme, the argument has been ar-
ticulated as a claim that cyberspace constitutes a self-ruling jurisdiction,
an autonomous realm within which Internet users should govern them-
selves. More commonly, it has been argued that the Internet's structural
indifference to geographic position is incongruous with the fundamental
assumptions of personal jurisdiction and sovereignty at play in territo-
rial-based law.26 The claim of cyber-sovereignty is famously captured in
the assertion directed at national governments by net-activist John Perry
Barlow, in his A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace: "You
have no moral right to rule [cyberspace] nor do you possess any methods
of enforcement we have true reason to fear ... Cyberspace does not lie
within your borders."27 Such arguments have rightly been criticized as
discounting the dependence of the Internet on persons identified by and
subject to conventional law, as well as the existence of computational
systems situated in the physical world.28 It must also be remembered that
the U.S. government funded the development of the initial Internet infra-
structure, ARPANET, and that the Internet arose as a governmental
solution to concerns about the security of the nation's information infra-
structure.29
Another shade of argument takes a more realistic approach to oppos-
ing on-line regulation and focuses on the potential chilling effects of
regulating on-line speech and conduct. Advocates of this position ac-
knowledge that nations can regulate on-line activities within their own
states and those that have local effects, but stress that the traditional basis
for on-line regulation-the impact of actions upon a state-will result in
a jurisdictional morass, an overabundance of jurisdictional claims, and
an undesirable increase in the cost of online publication.3° Because many
on-line transmissions have can be said to have an effect on many nations,
conventional jurisdictional analysis would permit every nation to regu-
late the same on-line activities. Due to variance among national laws, if
26. Dan L. Burk, Federalism in Cyberspace, 28 CONN. L. REV. 1095 (1996).
27. John Perry Barlow, A Cyberspace Independence Declaration, at www.eff.org/
Publications/JohnPerryBarlow/barlow_0296.declaration (last visited Apr. 3, 2003).
28. See, e.g., Amy Lynn Bomse, Note, The Dependence of Cyberspace, 50 DUKE L.J.
1717 (2001).
29. Id. at 1721-22.
30. See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae Chamber of Commerce of the United States, et al.,
Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et L'Antisemitisme, 169 ESupp.2d 1181 (N.D.
Cal 2001) (No. C 00-21275 JF).
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states regulated the Internet, online actors would inevitably be subject to
inconsistent regulations. As a result, most unilateral national regulations
of the Internet-especially the most restrictive-will have spillover im-
pact, intruding upon the regulatory efforts of other nations and impacting
the on-line activities of actors in other states.
Emblematic of these concerns is a 1999 German case involving the
U.S. Internet Service Provider (ISP) Compuserve. Compuserve was
threatened with indictment for carrying sex-related material in its on-line
discussion groups in violation of German anti-pornography laws. Con-
cerned about the prospect of prosecution, Compuserve blocked access to
the groups. Given the network's structure, however, the action prevented
access for all CompuServe users, the majority of whom were in the
United States.' The company's decision met with a cold reception within
the free speech advocacy and technical community. As free-market ad-
herents The Economist formulated the problem: "When Bavaria wrinkles
its nose, must the whole world catch a cold?"32
To those who oppose state-based regulation, because unilateral na-
tional action will unduly impact other nations, states should defer to
status quo, with the inevitable consequence of having their regulatory
goals frustrated. While couched in terms of "illegitimate" jurisdiction,
the rhetoric of "chilling effects" is a thin veil for the fear that the regula-
tory activities of restrictive nations will endanger the free flow of on-line
transmissions and consequently of balkanize the net. The regulation crit-
ics' hostility is derived less from the alleged illegitimacy of state actions
than "from the view that national regulation will lead to restrictions on
cherished rights.... For the critics, the legal objection to national
regulation, supports what is, at base, a certain normative view
concerning limitations on a given rights-based activity."33 Notably, the
regulation critics' view signals a normative approach that aligns with the
American predisposition for a permissive speech regime.
In place of chilling unilateral regulations, the opponents of regula-
tion place their faith in private or self-enforced regulation of cyberspace
as a preferable autonomy-enhancing alternative to state-based law. One
scholar proposes the formation of non-governmental "cyberlaw" or "the
common law of the internet" modeled upon the lex mercatoria of inter-
31. A German court subsequently found CompuServe liable and sentenced the head of
the company's German division to a two-year suspended sentence. The conviction was later
reversed. See In the Name of the People Judgment of the Local Court Munich in the Criminal
Case v. Somm, Felix Bruno, translated at http://www.cyber-rights.org/isps/sonm-dec.htm (last
visited Apr. 3, 2003).
32. Sex on the Internet, THE ECONOMIST, Jan. 6, 1996, at 18.
33. Mody, supra note 7, at 371.
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national business practice.4 This lex informatica would originate in the
private ordering of on-line participants and over time "new rules would
emerge to govern cyberspace. 35 Others make a similar claim that the net
favors decentralized norm-based rulemaking-models in which "[t]he
power to create and shape ... rules is not concentrated in the hands of
any individual group, or institution [and] is spread among various social
agents. 36 Justifying this postmodern brand of sovereignty, Johnson and
Post, for example, point to the "erosion of national sovereignty in the
modern world and the failure of existing system of nation-states to culti-
vate a moral connection between the individual and community (or
communities) in which she is embedded., 37 Downplaying the abiding
significance of regional norms, the regulation critics proffer the decen-
tralized emergent decision-making of the Internet as "a more promising
basis for democratic politics.
38
3. Free Speech and Free Markets
As described above, the initial topology of the Internet corresponded
with a libertarian bias against governmental intervention. This ideology
was in turn reflected by a network "architecture [that] has embedded
rules for information flows that advance self-regulation and free market
choice over public decision-making., 39 This technological state-of-affairs
was furthered by the United State's unique position vis-A-vis Internet
governance: the creation of the network by its scientists and academics
ceded it control of the Internet's technical standards and decision-
making bodies. The distinctly American approach to regulation that
drove the development of the medium expressed the confluence of two
factors: first, a governmental bias toward deregulation in favor of the free
market, and second, the compatibility of the permissive free flow of in-
formation and lack of content regulation with the perceived categorical
mandate of the First Amendment.
While, as we have seen, technologists built the network to maximize
the free and open flow of information, as the Internet became commer-
cialized this "libertarianism shifted from its counter-cultural roots [in the
technical community] to a free market philosophy.' 40 The deregulatory
34. See Joel Reidenberg, Lex Informatica: The Formulation of Information Policy
through Technology, 76 TEx. L. REV. 553 (1998).
35. Johnson & Post, supra note 14, at 1367.
36. See, e.g., Niva Elkin-Koren, Copyrights in Cyberspace-Rights Without Laws?, CHi-
KENT L. REV. 1155, 1161 (1998).
37. Johnson & Post, supra note 14, at 1397.
38. Johnson & Post, supra note 14, at 1398.
39. Reidenberg, supra note 2, at 273.
40. Bomse, supra note 28, at 1726.
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approach was advanced by the Clinton Administration and the Federal
Communications Commission's conviction that private industry should
41lead in the advancement of the computing industries and e-commerce.
This free market approach to the Internet-contrasted with the regulation
of other communications platforms, such as telephony and broadcast
media-was credited with rapid commercial expansion of the network
and the development and deployment of commercial applications.
The unimpeded flow of information was further reinforced by its
compatibility with United State's speech-protective tradition. Most
notably, when Congress sought to regulate the distribution of obscene
materials on-line through the Communications Decency Act, the Supreme
Court in 1996 overturned the statute, relying upon the technical properties
of the medium.42 In effect, the Court's opinion interpreted cyberspace as
the endpoint of American First Amendment jurisprudence."
In keeping with the above, in their treatment of jurisdiction, U.S.
courts, deferred to the existing technological state of affairs. Accepting
the network's absence of geographic boundaries, courts declined to im-
pose national regulations on cyberspace transmissions emanating from
beyond state or national borders." In the words of one sympathetic court,
which embraced the cascading logic of chilling effects:
[A defendant] cannot be prohibited from operating its Internet
site merely because the site is accessible from within one coun-
try in which its product is banned. To hold otherwise would be
tantamount to a declaration that this Court, and every other court
41. The Clinton administration endorsed deregulation of the Internet in its Framework for
Global Electronic Commerce. President William J. Clinton & Vice President Albert Gore, Jr.,
A Framework for Global Electronic Commerce, available at http://dcc.syr.edu/ford/course/e-
commerce-framework.pdf (July 1, 1997) (last visited Apr. 3, 2003) ("For [the Internet's] po-
tential to be realized fully governments must adopt a non-regulatory, market oriented approach
to electronic commerce.").
42. See, ACLU v. Reno, 521 U.S. 844 (1997). In contrast to the majority opinion, how-
ever, Justice O'Connor, concurring in part and dissenting in part, looked toward a future in
which zoning was a technical reality, noting that the "transformation of cyberspace is not
complete." Id. at 891.
43. In cyberspace, the Court noted:
through the use of chat rooms, any person with a phone line can become a town
crier with a voice that resonates farther than it could from any soapbox. Through
the use of Web pages, mail exploders, and newsgroups, the same individual can be-
come a pamphleteer. As the District Court found, "the content on the Internet is as
diverse as human thought."
Id. at 896-97 (citing ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 842 (1996)).
44. See, e.g., Digital Equipment v. Altavista Tech., Inc., 960 F. Supp. 456, 462 (D. Mass.
1997) ("The Internet has no territorial boundaries. To paraphrase Gertrude Stein, as far as the
Internet is concerned, not only is there perhaps 'no there there,' the 'there' is everywhere
where there is Internet access.") (emphasis omitted).
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throughout the world, may assert jurisdiction other court
throughout the world, may assert jurisdiction over all informa-
tion providers on the global World Wide Web. 5
Within the domestic context, this deference toward technology was
reflected in decisions overturning state regulations of the Internet under
the dormant commerce clause, most notably American Library Associa-
tion v. Pataki. In Pataki, the court overturned a New York state law that
sought to regulate obscene content, noting, "the Internet is wholly insen-
sitive to geographic distinctions. In almost every case, users of the
Internet neither know nor care about the physical location of the Internet
resources they access'01
While American free speech advocates evince a deep attachment to
this deferential approach to geographic indifference, from the perspec-
tive of the international community, a self-ordering approach to on-line
regulation is both legally and politically unsatisfactory. It does not itself
adequately protect regional interests and downplays the harms that arise
from declining to regulate. Simply put, the protection of local values
cannot be achieved without state-based regulatory intervention of some
kind. As described below, the claims of the regulation critics against uni-
lateral state-based action are no longer descriptively accurate and, given
technological developments, the theoretical underpinnings of their nor-
mative arguments have been substantially weakened. The critics of the
free market approach anticipate the introduction of state-based extraterri-
torial regulation, by emphasizing the compatibility of the existing
framework of jurisdiction within international law and conflict-of-laws
analysis to the on-line world.
B. The Internet's New Borders
While in the view of its most radical proponents the Internet
changed everything, even they must acknowledge that one thing it did
not change was local law. In contrast to the overstated rhetoric of the
regulation critics, a more pragmatic approach has cautioned that the
borderless nature of the Internet is not technologically predetermined.
The next stage of Internet scholarship begins with the idea that the
network's architecture is instead deeply contingent, and that the
application of local regulations to behavior in cyberspace is both
45. Playboy Enterprise v. Chuckleberry Publ'g, Inc., 939 F. Supp. 1032, 1039 (S.D.N.Y.
1996).
46. Am. Library Ass'n v. Pataki, 969 F Supp 160 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
47. Id. at 170.
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unavoidable and legitimate." The assertion that governments cannot
regulate the on-line world has been shown to depend upon a particular
set of decisions regarding the architecture of the network.4 9 Complexity
built into the network sets the stage for national regulation and permits
established legal and social principles based upon territoriality-such as
transnational legal doctrine-to find their way on-line. Contrary to the
wishes of those "observers that .. renounce the state as the legitimate
actor of transnational cyberspace activity "'5° these developments affirm
the status of the nation-state in the networked world.
1. Geography's Revenge
The intervention of states in attempting to control the information
flow of the Internet is of course not a new thing." China, for example,
has for many years sought to secure its "informational sovereignty" from
Western websites by controlling access to the Internet through centrally
regulated government servers or "firewalls. 52 An assortment of new
technologies, however, has brought geography to the Internet as a wide-
spread commercial and political reality. In particular, the development of
geographic-location technologies provides information about the physi-
cal location of Web resources and the people that access them.53
Generally speaking, these technologies pinpoint a user's location by cor-
relating their network address with their location in physical space.
While these tools may initially have been spurred by the demands of the
48. See, e.g., LESSIG, supra note 11; ANDREW SHAPIRO, THE CONTROL REVOLUTION:
HOW THE INTERNET IS PUTTING PEOPLE IN CHARGE AND CHANGING THE WORLD WE KNOW
(1999); Neal Weinstock Netanel, Cyberspace 2.0, 79 Tx. L. REV. 447 (2000); Reidenberg,
supra note 34.
49. LESSIG, supra note 11, at 25 ("There is no single way that the Net has to be; no single
architecture defines the nature of the Net").
50. Moday, supra note 7, at 370.
51. See Leonard R. Sussman, Censor DotGov: The Internet and Press Freedom 2000, at
http://www.freedomhouse.org/pfs2000/ (last visited Apr. 3, 2003) (surveying restrictions on
print and electronic journalists worldwide).
52. See, e.g., Peter H. Lewis, Limiting a Medium Without Boundaries, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
15, 1996, at DI.
53. The Internet Engineering Task Force-the most prominent technical standards body
with a hand in defining communications standards for the Intemet-is encouraging the im-
plementation of the next-stage Internet transmission protocol,Ipv6, which would uniquely
identify devices attached to the network. See S. Deering & R. Hinden, Internet Protocol, Ver-
sion 6 (Ipv6) Specifications, RFC2460 (Dec. 1998) at http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2460.txt (last
visited Apr. 3, 2003). The protocol was developed as a means of expanding the over-extended
IP address system, but promises enhanced security and the capacity for informational target-
ing, by making users more easily identifiable by assigning serial numbers to each computer's
network-connection hardware. Privacy groups have expectedly raised concerns regarding
implementation of an all-encompassing digital map, whereas on-line commercial entities
support the initiative. See Patricia Jacobus, Building Fences, One by One, CNET News, Apr.
19, 2001, at http://news.com.com/2009-1023-255774-2.html (last visited Apr. 3, 2003).
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market, legislators and courts have predictably been attracted to such
technologies as a means of imposing real-space limitations on the on-
line environment.' The need to comply with national laws has in turn
driven market demand for such services."
From a commercial perspective, the primary interest is the
development of new tools for on-line advertising and other
demographically oriented services. Marketing, like nation-based legal
regulation, relies upon reaching targeted subsets of a given population.'
6
Where before on-line advertising lacked the specificity necessary to target
a local audience, commercial advancement of geographic tools will enable
advertising to be aimed at persons within a given region.5 More
generously, geo-location technologies are intended to serve as a means of
enhancing usability and efficiency for users. 8 Such tools could allow for
content providers to offer content in local languages and provide
geographically-specific subject matter, such as weather or sports reports.
On the flipside, they will also permit publishers to increase profits by
price discriminating among their customers for such customized
services.
As suggested by the Yahoo! case, once in place, jurisdiction-
targeting technologies will in turn be perceived by by governments and
regulators as technologies of jurisdiction-avoidance, supporting the crea-
tion and implementation of state-based law in cyberspace. While states
may be unlikely to directly mandate the use of such technologies, wide-
spread adoption will leave policymakers and courts increasingly
comfortable placing geographic limitations on on-line activity, especially
54. Lawrence Lessig has argued that it is the growth of commerce that is the principal
engine of changes of network architecture. Lessig refers to the pre-commercialized Internet as
"Net95," and has argued that the need for security and confidentiality brought with them the
need for regulations and the technological capacity to make such features possible. See LES-
SIG, supra note 11.
55. See The Internet's New Borders, supra note 12.
56. Several companies have arisen to meet the demand for "geo-location" technologies as
the next stage of e-commerce-both for enhanced commercial applications as well as to pro-
vide a shield from legal liability. Industry leader Quova's service, called GeoPoint, works by
"continually updating a database that links Internet Protocol (IP) addresses to countries, cities
and even postcodes'" See Putting It in Its Place: Geography and the Net, THE ECONOMIST,
Aug. 11, 2001. Quova's GeoPoint service determines the location of Internet users by map-
ping the Internet infrastructure of over 4 billion IP addresses. When a user visits a website that
is equipped with GeoPoint software, his/her IP address is relayed to Quova's servers, which
correlate the address with a geographical location. Id. This information can be used by content
providers to modify content based on users physical location. Quova claims to be able to iden-
tify web users' country of origin with 98% accuracy, and their city of origin (at least for users
in the United States) 85% of the time. Id.
57. Id. ("Once the user's location is known, existing demographic databases, which have
been honed over the years to reveal what kinds of people live where, can be brought into
play.").
58. See generally Blumenthal & Clark, supra note 24.
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as they grow confident that the technologies will allow for practical and
effective compliance with local law.5 9 We can anticipate, for example, a
swift reconsideration in the U.S. of the applicability of local taxes for
on-line commercial transactions. 60
For commercial and governmental purposes, perfection of geo-
location tools is not a necessity.6, While regulation skeptics criticize their
technical accuracy and focus on the ability of users to circumvent
geographically imposed restrictions, such tools need only be reasonably
effective in order to facilitate the desired regulatory impact. Legislators
and courts alike want to develop effective and reasonable standards for
asserting jurisdiction over on-line activity; thus, technology need not be
perfect or apply to each citizen in order to satisfy a state's regulatory
goals. As Lawrence Lessig notes: "[Regulations] need not raise the cost
of prohibited activity to infinity in order to reduce the level of that
activity quite substantially. If regulation increases the cost of access to
... information, it will reduce access to this information."
62
The imposition of local laws will raise the costs of on-line publica-
tion by pressuring content providers to reconsider the relative costs and
benefits of publication against compliance. It will leave them with a
59. For example, in December 2001, the Canadian House of Commons adopted amend-
ments to Section 31 of the Canadian Copyright Act with addresses the ability of Internet
retransmitters to supply broadcast content on-line in a geographically specific manner. See
The Canadian Intellectual Property Office, Proposed Amendments to Section 31 of the Copy-
right Act, Dec. 12, 2001 at http://strategis.ic.gc.ca/sc-mrksv/cipo/cp/cp-sec3 l-amend-e.html
(last visited Apr. 3, 2003). The amendments respond to a prior "loophole" in Canadian law,
which permitted Internet companies to retransmit broadcast content royalty-free. When the
Canadian company ICraveTV adopted a business model based on the retransmission of con-
tent from captured signals from Toronto and New York, it was then subject to suits for the
redistribution of content in the United States. The bill would establish a framework that will
allow new types of distribution systems, including the Internet, to be used to retransmit broad-
cast signals if they meet appropriate conditions set out in the regulations. If adopted, the
amendments would most certainly be implemented through regulations requiring retransmit-
ters to limit their signals to Canadians or else cease doing business. See Steve Bonisteel,
Canada Unveils 'ICraveTV' Changes to Copyright Law, NEWSBYTES, Dec. 23, 2001.
60. The Internet Tax Freedom Act, which was signed into law by President Clinton on
October 21, 1998, reflected a national policy decision to keep the Internet unfettered by state
and local taxation during the critical early formation period of the Internet. The Act's major
provision imposed a three-year moratorium on state and local taxes of the Internet. In Novem-
ber 2001, the Senate approved an additional two-year moratorium passed by the House,
extending the deadline to November 1, 2003.
61. See Lawrence Lessig, The Zones of Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REv. 1403, 1405 (1996)
("A regulation need not be absolutely effective to be sufficiently effective.... If government
regulation had to show that it was perfect before it was justified, then indeed there would be
little regulation of cyberspace, or of real space either. But regulation, whether for the good or
the bad, has a lower burden to meet."). See also Jack Goldsmith and Alan Sykes, The Internet
and the Dormant Commerce Clause, 110 YALE L.J. 785, 812 (2001) ("Regulatory slippage is a
fact of life in real space and cyberspace alike.").
62. Lessig, supra note 61, at 1405.
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choice: to publish freely and accept legal accountability; to keep some
material off the Internet entirely, for fear of criminal and civil charges
filed in different countries or even different states; or to give access only
to certain viewers, by installing on-line gates and checkpoints around
their sites. While civil libertarians and multinational commercial entities
express concern about the chilling and self-censoring potential of con-
tent providers having to internalize the cost of complying with
incompatible regulatory frameworks, a fair assessment of the overall im-
pact of state-based laws will depend greatly on the (declining) cost of
jurisdiction-avoidance and the extent to which publishers perceive state
action to be a threat. As described below, those who defend the legiti-
macy of unilateral national regulation believe that, given the limited
enforcement power of states, the impact of regulatory burdens on on-line
content providers has been greatly exaggerated.
2. In Defense of Unilateral Internet Regulation
Alongside these technological shifts, scholars have reverted to doc-
trinal first principles to argue that traditional legal analysis grounded in
transnational law and conflict-of-laws analysis may adequately address
disputes that arise over the regulation of new communications technolo-
gies. 63 In this view, far from constituting a distinct "cyber-sovereignty,"
persons interacting in cyberspace do things and cause harms that are
regulated by states when they take place over other communications me-
dia, and the Internet should be no different. In the words of Michael
Froomkin: "We do not find concepts such as 'telephonespace or 'auto-
space' helpful and for good reason; cyberspace is not a place, but only a
metaphor-often an unhelpful one."6
The most vocal critic of the "regulation critics" has been Jack
Goldsmith. Goldsmith has sought to dispel some of the common myths
not only about the feasibility, but the legitimacy under international law,
of state regulation of the Internet. In a series of articles, Goldsmith has
presented a pragmatic approach to the problem of on-line regulation and
extraterritorial jurisdiction, stressing the applicability of conflict-of-laws
analysis to the on-line world.6- Downplaying the novelty of on-line
jurisdictional conflicts, Goldsmith has argued that national governments
63. See, e.g., Mody, supra note 7.
64. Michael Froomkin, Symposium on the Internet and Legal Theory: The Empire Strikes
Back, 73 CHI-KENT L. REV. 1101, 1106 n.26 (1999).
65. See Goldsmith, Against Cyberanarchy, supra note 13; Jack L. Goldsmith, The Inter-
net and the Abiding Significance of Territorial Sovereignty, 5 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD.
475 (1998); Jack Goldsmith, Regulation of the Internet: Three Persistent Fallacies, 73 CHI-
KENT L. REV. 1119 (1998); and Jack Goldsmith, What Internet Gambling Teaches About
Internet Regulation, 32 INT'L. LAW 1115 (1998).
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may lawfully regulate the global Internet, just as they do other
communications media. Goldsmith describes the anti-regulation sentiment
as being premised on three erroneous presumptions: first, that the
application of regulation to acts that originate abroad is impermissibly
extraterritorial; second, that unilateral regulation will illegitimately
undermine the regulatory efforts of other nations; and, third, that foreign
nationals will impermissibly lack notice of local regulations that they
may find applied to them.66
Regarding the first argument, Goldsmith argues that from the per-
spective of international law, the unilateral application of national law on
extraterritorial actors is perfectly legitimate. He rightfully notes that in-
ternational law has long grappled with the extraterritorial enforcement of
national laws and the inherent challenges to sovereignty and governance
that it represents. Over time, a jurisdictional framework, extending be-
yond the territoriality of the nation state, has developed to take account
of transnational commercial enterprises. With the increasing economic
interdependence of the international community, the framework for ju-
risdiction has come to acknowledge the need for states to protect their
distinct sovereign interests against the conduct of actors located beyond
their borders when such conduct results in local harm.
As Goldsmith shows, the claim that the extraterritorial enforcement
of local regulations represents an illegitimate application of local law is
rooted upon an anachronistic conception of jurisdictional scope-one in
which sovereignty was taken to be an absolute principle of international
law, and it was said that "no state has the right to intervene in the internal
or external affairs of another."67 In contrast, under modem jurisdictional
doctrine, prescriptive jurisdiction enables states to make their laws appli-
cable to cases where the conduct "has or is intended to have substantial
effect within its territory.' 68 On this analysis, the fact that harm is trans-
mitted through cyberspace should have no impact on a state's interest in
protecting itself nor the underlying legitimacy of its actions. 69 Comparing
66. Goldsmith, Against Cyberanarchy, supra note 13, at 1204.
67. Convention on Rights and Duties of States, Dec. 26, 1933, art. 8, 49 Stat. 3097, 3100,
165 L.N.T.S. 19.
68. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 402(l)(c) (1987).
69. Goldsmith, Regulation of the Internet: Three Persistent Fallacies, supra note 65, at
1121 ("Net users are not removed from our world. They are no more removed than telephone
users, postal users, or carrier-pigeon users. They are in front of a screen in real space using a
keyboard and scanner to communicate with someone else, often in a different territorial juris-
diction. And these real-space communications can cause real-space harms. Internet gambling
can decrease in-state gambling revenues and create family strife; a book uploaded onto the net
can violate an author's copyright; a chatroom participant can defame someone outside the
chatroom; terrorists can promulgate bomb-making or kidnapping tips; merchants can conspire
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cyberspace regulation to the extraterritorial application of national law in
other contexts, Goldsmith notes, nations have long applied local law to
regulate broadcasts from abroad, pollution from offshore sources, local
crimes initiated elsewhere, the harmful local consequences of out-of-
state monopolistic behavior and alike.7°
As for the second concern, regulatory spillover, Goldsmith argues,
"the legitimacy of a state's exercise of prescriptive jurisdiction has never
been held to turn on a measurement of its spillover effects."7, Given that
many regulations have spillover impact-indeed, it is a "commonplace
consequence ... in our increasingly interconnected world"72-- courts
cannot defer from a finding of jurisdiction merely because it will have an
adverse impact on other nations. Moreover, it is argued, the spillover
impact of Internet regulations has been exaggerated, and is not likely to
be substantially different from the impact that arises from conventional
regulations of this sort.
It is this last point-that the impact of unilateral cyberspace
regulation will be no different from regulation of real-space activity-
that is critical to assessing the true impact of unilateral regulations.
Goldsmith highlights that the actions undertaken by a particular foreign
nation to protect its citizens do not imply that all Internet transactions
can be regulated by all nations, as the argument focusing on chilling
effects would assert. Rather, he argues, the true scope and power of a
nation's regulation is measured by its enforcement jurisdiction, not its
prescriptive jurisdiction. While the prescriptive jurisdiction of a state
may theoretically encompass the whole globe, a nation can enforce its
regulations only against those that have local presence or assets. Thus,
according to Goldsmith, national regulations will have a differential
impact upon large and small actors. Multinational companies, Goldsmith
argues, will engage in a cost-benefit analysis when considering whether
to fix prices by e-mail; a corporation can issue a fraudulent security; or a pornographer can
sell kiddie porn.").
70. Id.
71. Mody, supra note 7, at 383. While the existence of spillover effects does not per se
invalidate the application of prescriptive jurisdiction, the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Rela-
tions Law lists as relevant factors: "the extent to which another state may have an interest in
regulating the activity" and "the likelihood of conflict with regulation by another state." Re-
statement (Third) Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 403(g) & (h) (1987). The
"reasonableness" requirements of § 403, however, have been criticized as an inaccurate state-
ment of the rules of customary international law, running contrary to the historical practice of
national courts to find jurisdiction in all cases, other than those in which there are is no local
impact. See, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank, Case Two: Extraterritorial Application of United State
Law Against United States and Alien Defendants (Sherman Act), 29 NEw ENG. L. REv. 588,
591 (1995) ("Few people ... other than those who drafted the relevant sections .. . believe
that section 403 states rules of customary international law.").
72. Goldsmith supra note 1 , at 1212.
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to target particular states. The hypothetical burdens faced by
multinational cyberspace actors represent, on this view, a cost of doing
business, no different from the burdens those same entities face in real-
space. 73 New technological innovations such as geo-location technology
and the efficiencies of doing business on-line are likely to compensate
for the perceived necessity of jurisdiction-avoidance.
The limitations of enforcement jurisdiction lead Goldsmith to con-
clude that the impact of unilateral regulations will not overburden online
publishers or cripple the Internet-or, as James Boyle puts it, "if the
King's writ reaches only so far as the king's sword, then much of the
content of the Internet might be presumed to be free from the regulation
of any particular sovereign. 74 This point is essential to Goldsmith's ar-
gument, for if true, it entails that "the vast majority of Internet content
providers need worry only about the regulations of the nation in which
they have some physical presence such as assets, bank accounts or em-
ployees., 75 While states can-as they have for offshore actors in the
past-use a variety of indirect mechanisms to protect themselves,
smaller actors cannot directly be reached. As such, it is claimed that they
will not find imposed upon them significant legal, and hence, behavioral
constraints.
The third charge of the "regulation critics" is that Internet regulation
inevitably creates a notice problem. Given the many states in which con-
tent is made available, it is inevitable that on-line actors will not know
beforehand what transmissions will be perceived as unlawfully causing
73. It must be noted, however, that the interests of international business enterprises lie at
the crux of competing claims of national jurisdiction and that increases in the cost of doing
business internationally as such should not be underestimated. In 1987, a survey commis-
sioned by the International Chamber of Commerce found that "extraterritorial applications of
national laws and policies impose significant costs on some sectors of international business."
THE EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF NATIONAL LAWS 3 (Dieter Lange & Gary Born eds.,
1987). In particular, the study found that often countries were subject to inconsistent regula-
tions, such that governments had required actions to be taken in foreign countries that were
"prohibited by those foreign countries," placing those countries in a position whereby the were
forced to disobey one country's laws and potentially incur fines and civil penalties. Uncer-
tainty with regard to which nations laws would be applied to a particular course of action was
felt to "discourage[] international businesses from engaging in productive trade and invest-
ment." In conclusion, the report found that, "[t]he overall impact of the extraterritorial
application of national laws is to discourage and prevent useful economic activity in the form
of international investment, and to reduce the profitability of existing investment."
74. Boyle, supra note 16, at 179. See also Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Will the Judgment-Proof
Own Cyberspace?, 32 INT'L LAW 1121, 1123 (1998) ("The real problem is turning ajudgment
supported by jurisdiction into meaningful economic relief. The problem is not the adaptability
of International Shoe-obtaining jurisdiction in the theoretical sense. The problem is obtaining
meaningful relief.").
75. Jack Goldsmith, The Internet, Conflicts of Regulation, and International Harmoniza-
tion, in GOVERNANCE IN THE LIGHT OF DIFFERING LOCAL VALUES 198, 199 (Cristoph Engel
& Kenneth H. Keller, eds. 2000).
Regulating Speech Across Borders
local harm in other territories.76 Goldsmith is characteristically unsympa-
thetic to a claim that ignorance of the law can be equated with
illegitimacy. He argues that transnational law acknowledges no such no-
tice requirement, which would cause local harms to be exempt from
regulation merely because a defendant was unaware of the regulations.
Moreover, if, for the sake of argument a notice requirement exists, a
court's assessment takes into account the reasonable foreseeability of the
defendant's knowledge of the regulation; foreseeability is a "dynamic
concept" that encompasses the type and nature of the offense. 8 In other
words, courts will have the flexibility to rule that given the nature of new
communications technologies the defendant had reason to know that the
material would be available in the nation where the offense occurred,
even absent explicit intent.
The upshot of Goldsmith's argument is that in our globally net-
worked environment, as in the emergent global economy that predated it,
international commercial entities will grapple with the competing claims
of nations. When commercial entities attempt to use the distributional
mechanism of the Internet to conceal or advance practices that they
would otherwise be found liable for, courts should rightfully find such
actions to lie within the harmed nations' bounds of jurisdiction. Over
time, courts will develop an understanding that extends the template of
the international jurisdictional framework to new communications tech-
nologies, and for large actors, geo-location technology will help to ease
the burden of such regulatory measures.
Notably, Goldsmith's focus on the distinction between enforcement
jurisdiction and prescriptive jurisdiction as a limitation on the direct im-
pact of national regulations, reveals the flipside of unilateral regulation
in practice: The effectiveness of national regulation is inevitably ham-
pered by the limits of a state's ability to enforce its laws with respect to
out-of-state actors. When it comes to smaller actors, the attempt to pro-
tect local values through national regulation simply does not work, as
their ability to dodge enforcement affords them the opportunity to en-
gage in regulation avoidance. Such "offshore" actors are unlikely to
implement geo-location technologies voluntarily, and, without the influ-
ence of indirect state action, will remain beyond the effective reach of
states.
76. See, e.g., Paul Meller, Proposed Law Stirs Concern on Europe E-Commerce, N.Y
TIMES, Feb. 8, 2001, at WI.
77. Goldsmith, The Internet and the Abiding Significance of Territorial Sovereignty, su-
pra note 65, at 484-86.
78. Goldsmith, supra note 13, at 1243-44.
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3. An Important Caveat
It is clear that law and technology are together altering the landscape
of the Internet, making it increasingly amenable to national regulation.
As we have seen, the regulation critics underestimate the architectural
development of the network, the weight of regional norms, and the genu-
ine harms caused by a failure to regulate. The above analysis suggests
that objections to the application of national law on the Internet based
upon technology are no longer descriptively accurate, and second, that
national regulation of foreign entities is a legitimate and viable response
for states to local harm originating abroad.
Yet, we must take note of certain limitations inherent in the seeming
reconciliation of the sovereign state and the networked world. In particu-
lar, the claim that national regulations on the Internet are legitimate does
not itself address the overall impact of unilateral actions, their progres-
sive efficiency, or their effect upon the network's attributes. Goldsmith
admits as such, in an "important caveat," stating in a footnote:
[I discuss] the regulation of the Internet from the perspective of
jurisdiction and choice of law. This is an issue wholly distinct
from the merits of any particular regulation of the Intemet-for
example, whether particular national regulations of the Internet
promote democracy, or are efficient, or are good or bad for hu-
manity. Resolution of these substantive regulatory issues turn on
contested normative judgments and difficult context-specific,
cost-benefit analyses that have little to do with jurisdictional is-
79
sues.
As a response to the "sky-is-falling rhetoric" that extraterritorial
regulation represents an unauthorized use of state power and will cripple
the Internet, Goldsmith's work presents a measured response.' ° However,
while he helpfully situates national cyberspace regulation within the in-
ternational legal framework, having solved the "jurisdictional puzzle"'"
he stops short of addressing the full impact of unilateral actions. While
he asserts that large "offshore" content providers are unlikely to feel the
impact of unilateral regulations, he fails to consider if significant
changes in the network architecture are desirable for the international
system overall. Failure to scrutinize this question causes him to stop
short of accounting for what is distinct about on-line interactions, which
79. Goldsnith, supra note 75, at 200 n.10.
80. Jack Goldsmith, Yahoo! Brought to Earth, FINANCIAL IMES, Nov. 26, 2000, at 27
("A chorus of sky-is-falling rhetoric greeted the French court order requiring Yahoo! to block
French users from accessing Nazi memorabilia on its U.S. website. France's action, we are
told, constitutes illegitimate extraterritorial regulation.").
81. Goldsmith, supra note 75, at 200 n.10.
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in turn impacts other aspects of his analysis. Even with geo-location
technologies, cyberspace actors must strive to localize their on-line ac-
tivities, and the use of such technologies entails a cost-a financial cost
to content providers and the social cost of a network that is no longer
open and neutral. Without assessing these factors, the impact of prescrip-
tively legitimate unilateral exercises of jurisdiction upon the on-line
community remains unclear.
We must consider, then, with a more careful eye, the claim that the
spillover effects that are a relevant concern to international law are no
different in the arena of online regulation than in real space. The poten-
tial shortcomings of Goldsmith's approach are made clear when we turn
to consider an instance of the "substantive regulatory issues" he sets
aside; the problem of national expressive regulation, undertaken in sup-
port of local values. In response to the on-line prevalence of culturally
offensive content, states are increasingly willing to utilize an effects-
based jurisdictional test to adjudicate claims against on-line content pro-
viders. The steady flow of extraterritorial disputes heard in national
courts over expressive regulation provides the subject matter for assess-
ing Goldsmith's tenets and, I would suggest, demonstrates the need to
reevaluate Goldsmith's complacent optimism regarding the future status
of unilateral regulations.
II. YAHOO! v. LICRA: THE INTERNATIONAL TRIUMPH OF EFFECTS-
BASED UNILATERAL CYBERSPACE REGULATION
The Yahoo! litigation makes clear the willingness and capacity of
states to find jurisdiction and apply nation-specific laws on the Internet.
It marks the transition toward a network that incorporates geographic
lines and borders, and locates the leading impetus behind that trend in a
backlash response to the cultural and technological hegemony of the
United States in the on-line world. Yahoo! demonstrates that "the de-
mands of each territorial community, however it may be organized, [will]
continue to be the predicate and driving force of the system of interna-
tional jurisdiction. 82 In the context of Internet regulation, it demonstrates
82. Reisman, supra note 10, at xiv. (Rejecting proclamations regarding the death of the
nation state: "With [the] growth of transnational activity, the relevance, raison d'etre and fu-
ture of the state and the consequent law of international jurisdiction have been brought into
question. But hold the funeral shroud! Anticipation of the demise of the state is premature.
The exclusive territorial community to which the individual accords, and insists that others
accord, primary loyalty is neither an atavistic nor transient nor pathological phenomenon. It is,
rather, a response to a persisting set of human demands. There are cogent, 'rational' reasons
why human beings stubbornly continue to organize themselves in exclusive rather than the
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that individual territorial states are apt to be the driving force for further
technical developments as well.
In effect, the Yahoo! court extends the jurisdictional template from
other areas of extra-territorial enforcement into the arena of on-line
speech. An analysis of the French court's opinion and the U.S. district
court decision following it lay bare both the applicability and limitations
of formulaically applying the framework of international jurisdiction in
the context of new communications technologies. For while it suggests
the abiding significance of regional values, the Yahoo! litigation at the
same time demonstrates the unaccounted-for costs and inefficiencies of
pure unilateral regulation."
A. The Yahoo!.com French Case
On May 22, 2000, Judge Jean Jacques Gomez of the County Court
of Paris ordered Yahoo!, an American company to block access to Nazi
materials that were judge illegal to display under French law, Article R.
645-1 du Code Penal. Under that section, France's penal code outlaws
the wearing or public display of any uniform, insignia, or emblem of any
organization or person responsible for crimes against humanity. 4 It clas-
sifies such offenses as "serious crimes against the people, the state and
public safety."85 In keeping with the principles of international human
rights and the similar actions of other nations, France has sought such a
democratically chosen rule to guarantee its own internal public order and
the dignity of its citizens.
most inclusive of groups, why group boundaries are 'a functional necessity, not simply an
inert artefact of primordial cultural identities.' ").
83. See id. ("In more and more social sectors, activities that cross borders can no longer
be regulated effectively by the parts of the state apparatus that have hitherto been responsible
for them. Whether it is health, criminal activity-including terrorism and other forms of pur-
posive political violence-economic organization, immigration or border control, protection
of intellectual and material property or whatever, the state, acting alone, seems less and less
able to accomplish what is expected of it without locking itself into increasingly complex and
durable intergovernmental arrangements.").
84. See C. Pdn. R. 645-1.
85. Reidenberg, supra note 2, at 5.
86. The liberal stance of the United States with respect to offensive speech contrasts
markedly with European nations, for whom a commitment to equality and dignity demands
that offensive speech is suppressed. For a discussion of these differences, touching on the
Yahoo! dispute, see Kevin Boyle, Hate Speech-The United States Versus the Rest of the
World?, 53 ME. L. REV. 487 (2001). Boyle locates the European compulsion within the con-
text of twentieth century history. As contrasted with the U.S., in Europe, "hate speech was
once mainstream speech. It was central to European culture. There were no 'hate groups' es-
pousing racism and white superiority when it was in fact the official ideology or mainstream
idea. Today's racists wear our castoffs, and we have a responsibility for what is done with
those castoffs." Id. at 493. That said, Boyle characterizes the American and European ap-
proaches to hate speech as parallel strategies aimed at the same end: the eradication of speech
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On April 5, 2000, the French organization, La Ligue Contre Le
Racisme Et L'Antisemitisme (LICRA) sent a cease and desist letter to
Yahoo!'s in Santa Clara, California, threatening to take legal action if
Yahoo! did not cease the displaying Nazi objects for sale by third parties
on its auction site. Subsequently, LICRA, along with L'Union Des
Etudiants Juifs De France (UEJF), used the U.S. Marshal's Office to
serve process on Yahoo! in California. LICRA and UEJF then separately
filed civil complaints against Yahoo! in the Tribunal de Grande Instance
de Paris, alleging a violation of a French criminal statute that bars the
public display of Nazi-related "uniforms, insignia or emblems" in
France.
In defense, Yahoo! claimed that its actions, committed in the United
States, where such activities are routinely protected by the First Amend-
ment, lay beyond French territorial jurisdiction. Unconvinced, the
French court awarded prescriptive jurisdiction, and found, through the
application of an effects-based jurisdictional analysis, the means to pro-
tect its own citizens. As drafted, the French criminal law applies to any
crime or felony committed outside of France by foreign person when the
victim is a French national at the time of the infraction.87 Under French
law, the competency or prescriptive jurisdiction of courts is permitted
only to try cases in which an element of the infraction is committed on
French territory." Applying these principles to the facts of the case, the
French court ruled that the "visualization" of Nazi objects in France con-
stituted a violation of French law, and that the intentional transmission of
Yahoo!'s communications into France provided adequate grounds for
finding jurisdiction. While the court noted that Yahoo! had directed ad-
vertising in French to French users through technical honing
mechanisms, it is important to note that its finding was based not on Ya-
hoo!'s targeting of French citizens, but on the local impact of its
actions. In the view of the court, it was the offensive nature of the mate-
rial in question, rather than the actions of the company who sponsored it,
that supplied the rationale for the order.
that devalues persons on the basis of race, creed, or religion. Id. at 489-90. The difference can
be traced to the divergent means of achieving the same goal. In the U.S., the favored metaphor
of the marketplace of ideas, which supports the airing of the objectionable in the crucible of
public opinion, stands as a bulwark against targeting speech of any kind based on its content.
The history of Europe, however, elicits a bolder and more direct strategy.
87. See C. Pdn. 113-7.
88. See C. Pdn. 113-2.
89. In support of its assertion that Yahoo! American site was not targeting French users
the company maintained a distinct French subsidiary, Yahoo! France, and a separate French
web site hosted in France, which complied with French laws, and which the case against Ya-
hoo! did not implicate.
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Given that the nature of the offense consisted in the display of mate-
rials, it is unsurprising that the court concluded that the appropriate
remedy was to block the content in question. Recognizing the capacity
of new geo-location technologies, the court assessed the cost and effi-
cacy of technological measures for filtering that permit blocking the
material for one geographic region (the forum state, France), but not an-
other (the host state, the U.S.). The trial was interrupted for weeks while
court-appointed technical experts-one European, one American, and
one French-tried to determine whether geo-specific filtering technol-
ogy was practical. The experts' report indicated that approximately 70%
of French users were identifiable by their Internet Service Protocol Ad-
dresses, and that the remaining ambiguous users could be identified by
declaring nationality prior to the transmittal of Nazi material.9°
Based on this testimony, the court concluded that it would not be fi-
nancially burdensome for Yahoo! to adapt filtering for French users. On
November 20, 2000, the Tribunal de Grande Instance de Paris re-issued
the preliminary injunction against Yahoo! to take all possible measures to
dissuade and prevent French users from accessing WebPages stored on
Yahoo!'s U.S.-based server that auction Nazi objects or that present any
Nazi sympathy or holocaust denial. The court also established a fine of
$13,000 for each day the company did not comply with the order, fol-
lowing a three-month grace period.
The French decision captures the rapidly changing nature of the
Internet's communications framework. While Yahoo! asserted that the
French court's order "to filter our sites according to nationality was very
na've,"9' Yahoo!'s own behavior belied such a claim. As highlighted by
the court, during the time of the offense, Yahoo! profiled French users to
facilitate servicing them with advertisements in French. While the
French court's decision focused on harm and not intent, inevitably this
fact undermined Yahoo!'s opposition to France's application of
jurisdiction on the grounds that it was technically infeasible. It also
points to the desire for multinational companies to utilize geo-location
tools as a means of enhancing business practices, while at the same time
seeking to deny their capacity to conform with additional regulatory
mandates and internalize their cost. Ultimately, the French court
succeeded indirectly in achieving its goal. Rather than filter French
users, Yahoo! privileged concerns of reputation and potential liability,
and found it easier to revise its company policy with respect to the
auctioning of Nazi memorabilia. Rather than implement geo-location
90. T.G.I. Paris, Od. En refere du 20 Nov. 2000.
91. Brian Love, Can Neo-Nazis Yahoo! in France?, REUTERS, Aug. 10, 2000.
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tools for jurisdiction-avoidance, it achieved the change by monitoring its
site and redrafting its user agreements.92
Two years following the French decision, the impact of the Yahoo!
case as a harbinger of changes in technology and in the attitudes of
commercial actors continues to resound. In August 2002, Yahoo! volun-
tarily agreed to limit access to online content banned in China after
signing the Internet Society of China's Public Pledge of Self-Discipline
for the Chinese Internet Industry.93 Under the provisions of the pledge,
ISPs agree to "monitor the information publicized by users on web sites
according to (Chinese) law and remove the harmful information
promptly," and to refrain from "establishing links to web sites that con-
tain harmful information so as to ensure that the content of the network
information is lawful and healthy."94 Critically, the provisions of the
pledge are not limited to Web sites in China, but extend to the monitor-
ing by service providers of all sites that are accessible in China and
requires carriers to refuse access to foreign sites that disseminate harm-
ful information. Upon agreeing to the pledge, Yahoo! faced harsh public
criticism by Human Rights Watch and other civil liberties groups that
they were catering to official censorship in a state where politically op-
positional and religious views are routinely suppressed.95 Yahoo!'s
decision to broadly self-censor objectionable content, despite this back-
lash in the United States, dramatically illustrates the altered motivations
of those doing business globally in a post-Yahoo! context.
Yet, notably, in the aftermath of the French decision, two of the
technical experts utilized by the court expressed dissatisfaction with the
court's decision and the wider impact of the case. The European expert,
Ben Laurie, went so far as to issue an Expert's Apology on the web, ex-
pressing his consternation at the results.96 For both Laurie and the
92. Shortly following the French decision, Yahoo!'s competitor, the American online auc-
tion company Ebay announced that it was going to revise its user policy to forbid the display
and sale of hate-related items across the world. See Troy Wolverton, Ebay to Ban Sale of Hate
Items, CNET NEWS.COM, May 3, 2001, at http://news.com.com/2lOO-1017-256998.html (last
visited Apr. 3, 2003). While Ebay stated that the decision was not dictated by the Yahoo! liti-
gation, the decision reflects a clear calculus by the company that its expansion into
international markets would be facilitated through self-censorship.
93. Sumner Lemon, Rights Group Slams Yahoo! over China Pledge, ITWoRLD, Aug. 12,
2002.
94. Id.
95. Human Rights Watch, Yahoo! Risks Abuses Rights in China (Aug. 9, 2002) at http://
www.hrw.org/press/2002/08/yahooO8O9O2.htm (last visited Apr. 3, 2003) (quoting Kenneth
Roth, executive director of Human Rights Watch: "If it implements the pledge, Yahoo! will
become an agent of Chinese law enforcement. It will switch from being an information gate-
way to an information gatekeeper").
96. Ben Laurie, An Expert's Apology (Nov. 21, 2000) at http://www.apache-ssl.org/
apology.html (last visited Apr. 3, 2003).
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American expert, Vint Cerf, their technical assessment, which empha-
sized the imperfect nature of filtering tools, deliberately avoided the
political calculus undertaken by the French court; that is, they concerned
themselves with technical feasibility rather than with the policy assess-
ment of whether filtering should be mandated. According to both, the
French court ignored the "limitations and risks" associated with the or-
der, placing potential burdens on online content providers, yet
overlooking the critical inefficiency of such tools or the ability for de-
termined users to obtain offensive content.97
B. The Yahoo!.com U.S. Case
Despite the lack of an asserted attempt by French authorities to se-
cure damages from Yahoo! and a revision of Yahoo's company policy on
the matter, Yahoo! sought in some way to reject France's jurisdictional
authority. Mirroring the conceptual tenets of the regulation critics, Ya-
hoo! straddled the fence; stepping beyond the claim of technological
incapacity, it tried to shield itself behind the First Amendment. Whereas
neither claim was accepted by the French court, within weeks of the
French decision, Yahoo! brought an action in California district court
seeking declaratory relief rendering the French court's order unenforce-
able in the U.S., as an abrogation of free speech. Yahoo!'s stateside case
embodied the alarm raised by the French decision in the on-line business
community and among civil libertarians. The symbolic sentiment under-
lying the case is perhaps best captured in Yahoo! chairman Jerry Yang's
headstrong assertion that, "[w]e are not going to change the content of
our sites in the United States just because someone in France is asking
us to." 98 Similarly, free speech advocates applauded Yahoo!'s efforts,
supporting its use of the First Amendment as a "litigation strategy," and a
necessary stand against a dangerous precedent. 99
Ruling in favor of Yahoo!, the California court recognized the sover-
eignty of French law, but found the ruling repugnant to U.S. public
policy.'°° It rejected the possibility of enforcement on First Amendment
grounds, noting:
97. See Mark Ward, Experts Question Yahoo! Auction Ruling, BBC NEWS ONLINE, Nov.
29, 2000, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/sci/tech/1046548.stm (last visited Apr. 3, 2003).
98. Janet Komblum & Leslie Miller, Yahoo Won't Pull Nazi Memorabilia, USA TODAY,
June 19, 2000, at 3d.
99. See Brief Amici Curiae Center for Democracy and Technology, American Civil
Liberties Union, et al. in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, Yahoo! Inc. v.
La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et L'Antisemitisme, 169 F.Supp.2d 1181 (N.D. Cal 2001) (No.
COO-21275 JF) (arguing that "enforcement of the French court order in the United States
would fundamentally change the nature of the Internet as a medium of free expression").
100. It is worth noting that prior to losing on the merits of the case, LICRA asserted that
in fact the U.S. court lacked jurisdiction over them, given that LICRA maintained no contact
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The French order's content and viewpoint-based regulation,
while entitled to great deference as an articulation of French law,
clearly would be inconsistent with the First Amendment if man-
dated by a court in the United States. What makes this case
uniquely challenging is that the Internet in effect allows one to
speak in more than one place at a time. Although France has the
sovereign right to regulate what speech is permissible in France,
this Court may not enforce a foreign order that violates the pro-
tections of the United States Constitution by chilling protected
speech that occurs simultaneously within our borders.'°'
The U.S. district court decision fell squarely within the public policy
restriction on the enforcement of foreign judgments-according to
which the enforcement of a foreign judgment is refused when the enforc-
ing state's public policy is offended. 0 2 Just as courts have the discretion
to choose to adjudicate a claim upon a finding of jurisdiction, they have
the discretion to decline to enforce edicts that run counter to the ex-
pressed values of local law and to refuse extradition of citizens to
facilitate enforcement abroad.
This discretionary character of international comity was articulated
by the Supreme Court in Hilton v. Guyot-comity, the Court said, "does
not require, but rather forbids [recognition of a foreign judgment] where
such recognition works a direct violation of the policy our laws, and
does violence to what we deem the rights of our citizens."'0 3 Similarly,
the U.S. court in Yahoo! recognized the possibility for cooperative inter-
national decisions to alter an assessment of the issue, but found that
absent a body of law that establishes international standards with
respect to speech on the Internet and an appropriate treaty or leg-
islation addressing enforcement of such standards to speech
originating within the United States, the principle of comity is
with the U.S. Given the impact of the standing order and the servicing of papers to Yahoo! in
the U.S., the U.S. court was unconvinced.
101. Yahoo!, Inc. v. La Ligue Contre le Racisme et L'Antisemitisme, 169 F.Supp.2d
1181, 1192 (N.D. Cal. 2001).
102. See, e.g., Telnikoff v.Matusevitch, 702 A.2d 230, 247 (Md. 1997) (declining to en-
force British libel judgment on grounds that it conflicted with First Amendment); Bachchan v.
India Abroad Publ'ns Inc., 585 N.YS.2d 661 (1992) (same) ("There is no question that the
U.S. has a paramount interest in the activity in question, which occurs within its territorial
boundaries and is lawful here. The activity at issue is fully protected by the First Amendment,
and the United States has an overriding interest in protecting such activity.").
103. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 193 (1895) (internal quotations omitted).
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outweighed by the Court's obligation to uphold the First
Amendment.'°'
The French parties have appealed the decision of the district court
and the case is currently being reviewed before the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals.
C. A Regulatory Impasse
The judicial stalemate of the Yahoo! case embodies the fundamental
cultural tensions brought to light by the extraterritorial regulation of on-
line speech. The American allegiance to the First Amendment is as cen-
tral to the American perception of free speech as the moral imperative
and commitment to "personal dignity" that underlies the French hate
speech statute. This variance in approach does not detract from the fact
that both are legitimate policies of sovereign democratic political sys-
tems. However, in the end, neither the technology of the Internet nor the
system of international law gives one a greater claim to legitimacy than
the other.
Given the ability of states who oppose expansive prescriptive juris-
diction to protect their own sovereignty and self interest by narrowly
construing jurisdiction to enforce,' 5 attempts to impose unilateral na-
tional content regulations-against a First Amendment harbor-raise
inevitable friction.' °6 The discretionary feature of comity, as applied in
Yahoo!, represents a hurdle in the application of nation-based law on the
Internet; demonstrating why the limitations of enforcement may curtail
widespread liability for expressive conduct transmitted online. The ap-
plication of public-policy discretion raises the transaction costs for
foreign nations to impose local values extraterritorially. While it is true
that Yahoo! adopted the behavior desired by the French court, smaller
actors need not, even as their speech causes an equivalent regional harm.
The Yahoo! litigation shows that for the overall protection of local val-
ues, taking into account the indirect alternatives available to states,
unilateral application of local law is likely more costly than it is worth.
104. Yahoo!, Inc. v. La Ligue Contre le Racisme et L'Antisemitisme, 169 F Supp. 2d
1181, 1193 (N.D. Cal. 2001).
105. Symposium, The Internet Is Changing International Law, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
997 (1998).
106. See Joshua S. Bauchner, Note, State Sovereignty and the Globalizing Effects of the
Internet: A Case Study of the Privacy Debate, 26 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 689, 693 (2000)
("Since one state's sovereignty and its rights thereunder, is defined by the reaches of another
state's sovereignty in relation to it, only by acting to the peripheral limits of that power can a
state maximize the scope of its sovereign rights. Conversely, a state also will act to protect the
outer boundaries of its sovereignty from encroachment by another state. By doing so, a state
can ensure the greatest breadth of sovereign rights.").
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III. THE BIAS TOWARDS EFFECTS-BASED
JURISDICTIONAL ANALYSIS
A. Expanding Adjudicative Reach
While the decision in Yahoo! conforms with Goldsmith's model of
regulatory accountability for large commercial actors, Yahoo! must be
situated within a wider trend: a heightened resistance to a free market
and speech-permissive approach to Internet content regulation. As Mi-
chael Froomkin notes, "few if any nation-states are in a hurry to
relinquish their freedom of maneuver (read 'control' or 'power') to de-
centralizing, democratizing, even anarchistic forces such as the
Internet-at least not without a fight."'07 The French decision in Yahoo!
forces the recognition of local values and national policies in an envi-
ronment where they have previously been neglected. Responding to the
fact that the "technological underpinnings of the network violate the as-
sumptions embedded in prior law,"'0° it uses prior law to make the
network adapt. The central mechanism of the French decision is the ap-
plication of an effects-based analysis for international Internet
jurisdiction, employed as a means of imposing the social cost of global
Internet communications on content providers.
Within the U.S., the initial model for Internet jurisdiction relied
upon a sliding-scale passive-versus-active test, which was intended to
assess jurisdiction based on the nature and quality of the commercial
conduct. The test was outlined in the Pennsylvania case, Zippo Manufac-
turing Company v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc.' 9 Prior to Zippo, jurisdictional
assessments of on-line activities relied upon a conventional effects-test.
Such a test created a predictable potential for jurisdictional findings in
multiple jurisdictions and resultant uncertainty for on-line actors regard-
ing potential liability. The Zippo test built upon the notion that Internet
providers were unable to control the flow of content to distinguish be-
tween providers that merely place material on-line (passive sites) and
those had actively established contacts with a particular state (active
sites). Many American and Canadian courts subsequently adapted the
Zippo test.'' 0
107. Froomkin, supra note 64, at 1102.
108. Dan L. Burk, Virtual Exit in the Global Information Economy, 73 CHI.-KENT L.
REv. 943 (1998).
109. Zippo Manufacturing Co. v. Zippo Dot Com., Inc., 952 F. Supp 1119 (W.D. Pa.
1997).
110. Geist, supra note 5, at 1366-1371 (discussing post-Zippo case law that similarly
adopts a test under which the "the likelihood that jurisdiction can be constitutionally exercised
is directly proportionate to the nature and quality of commercial activity that an entity con-
ducts over the Internet") (emphasis in original).
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Yet, as Michael Geist has pointed out, this test led to erratic results.
Primarily, as a matter of definition, outside the context of commercial
sites, whether to characterize a particular site as interactive or not is far
from clear; "the majority of web sites are neither entirely passive nor
completely active.""' Moreover, especially in the case of objectionable
content, the "passivity" of the site does not adequately address the per-
ceived impact of visual or textual materials that negatively impact a
given state. Thus, it is not surprising that in response, more and more
courts have begun to find the passive-versus-active too constraining and
are moving toward an effects-based analysis for Internet jurisdiction.'
2
B. Yahoo's Progeny
The willingness of the French court in Yahoo! to use an effects-based
analysis to cast a wider adjudicative net and apply prescriptive jurisdic-
tion anticipated similar gestures by other national courts hearing claims
of extraterritorial harm arising from objectionable online content. Where
before, perhaps given the understanding that unilateral action would
have limited impact, courts deferred to the technological defaults of a
geographically indeterminate network, they are swiftly altering course.
In several recent cases concerning on-line speech regulations, judges
have found the accessibility of material to be sufficient grounds for ju-
risdiction under an effects test. Yet, unlike Yahoo!, where the fact that the
defendant targeted foreign users through language-specific advertising
undoubtedly influenced the court's analysis, in these cases the interactiv-
ity, nature, and intent of the site was deemed by the courts to be
immaterial to the finding of jurisdictional competence. Rather, the courts
focused solely on the perceived effects, intended or not, that the web site
had in the impacted jurisdiction.
In one prominent example, in December 2000, the German Supreme
Court, the Bundesgerichtshof, ruled that German hate speech laws,
which prohibit the denial of the Holocaust and the spreading of Nazi
propaganda, applied to on-line content and to non-Germans who post
such propaganda "on the Internet on a foreign server that is accessible to
Internet users in Germany. ' The decision upheld the conviction of an
Australian Holocaust revisionist, the German-born Frederick Toeben, for
distributing leaflets in Germany denying the holocaust. The
Bundesgerichtshof's ruling overturned the decision of a lower court,
111. Id. at 1379.
112. Id. at 1371-80 (describing the shift away from Zippo).
113. See Ian DeFreitas, Worldwide Web of Laws Threatens the Internet, FINANCIAL
TIMES, Jan. 9, 2001 (comparing the decision of the German Federal Court to the decision of
the French Court in Yahoo!).
Regulating Speech Across Borders
which acquitted Toeben on the grounds that it lacked jurisdiction to
adjudicate claims relating to content dispersed on servers physically
located in Australia. While the Bundesgerichtshof decision ordered his
retrial, the German government made no request to extradite him to
Germany, perhaps because he faced similar charges in his home state."4
Similarly, in January 2001, an Italian court held that it could enforce
its libel laws against anyone who posts content on the Internet, even if
the speaker is based in another country. "' The ruling stemmed from a
claim filed by an Israeli man living in Italy against a foreign web site for
slandering him in a report about a custody dispute."16 Finding that the
offense of defamation is an "offense-event" that occurs upon sight, the
Italian decision noted that for "offences against the person," there are
"no national boundaries for libel on the Internet.""' 7 Critically, the court
approached the Internet's open architecture as the medium's main defi-
cit, as "just the knot to be untied.""8
Whereas an Australian court declined extraterritorial enforcement of
local laws regulating expression in 1999 due to the inevitable global
reach of the network," 9 a year later another Australian court found such
114. The Executive Council of Australian Jewry brought a suit against Toeben in Austra-
lia seeking the enforcement of a Human Rights and Equal Opportunities Commission
(HREOC). The commission, a government body, ordered Toeben in October 2001 to remove
Holocaust revision material from his Adelaide Institute website. Toeben refused to do so. See
Australian Faces Trialfor Holocaust Denial, REUTERS, Dec. 14, 2000.
115. See In the Matter of Moshe D., Italy. Cass., closed session, Nov. 17-Dec. 27, 2000,
Judgment No. 4741 ("If confronted with a [defamatory statement] initiated abroad and termi-
nated ... in our Country, the Italian State is entitled to jurisdiction and the meting [out] of
punishment.").
116. Id. The disparity between the American and European approaches to hate speech is
paralleled in the context of defamation and libel; with the European standard more rigorously
protective of individual dignity. For example, whereas the American standard requires actual
malice, see New York imes Company v. Sullivan, 315 U.S. 254 (1964), the English standard is
rooted on strict liability and does not require the plaintiff to demonstrate that the defendant
had the intent to defame. For a comparison of the English and American approaches to libel,
see Eric P. Enson, Comment: A Roadblock on the Detour Around the First Amendment: Is the
Enforcement of English Libel Judgments in the United States Unconstitutional?, 21 Loy. L.A.
INT'L & CoMP. L. REV. 159 (1999).
117. In the Matter of Moshe D., Italy. Cass., closed session, Nov. 17-Dec. 27, 2000,
Judgment No. 4741, note 115.
118. Id. ("Information and images placed 'on the Net' relative to any person are (poten-
tially) accessible anywhere in the world. But this is just the knot to be untied because, given
the 'transnational' nature of the tool used, initially identification of the place where the crime
committed 'via the Internet' was perpetrated may seem difficult. As a matter of fact, an injuri-
ous statement, a degrading picture, a not very flattering comment posted on a 'web-site' are
subject to diffusion beyond all control there is no reasonable possibility of 'stoppage,' if not
through the coercive means legally reserved to public authorities (provided technical instru-
ments are available.").
119. See Macquarie Bank Ltd. v. Berg (1999) NSWSC 526. In Macqarie, the court, in an
unpublished opinion, refused, in light of the global nature of the Internet, to issue an injunc-
tion against material posted in the United States that was defamatory under Australian law.
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jurisdiction to be lawful. 20 The latter case, Gutnick v. Dow Jones & Co.
Inc., illustrates the impact that litigation in a foreign forum can have on
American businesses and captured considerable public attention. 2' In
Gutnick, Victorian Supreme Court Justice John Hedigan established ju-
risdiction over U.S.-based Dow Jones & Co. for a publication of the Wall
Street Journal Web site, which carried an allegedly libelous article about
the plaintiff, an American businessman living in Melbourne. The judge
rejected Dow Jones' argument that a U.S. court was the appropriate fo-
rum for the case, finding that publication occurred wherever the article
was downloaded, including, in this instance, Australia. In applying Aus-
tralia's defamation law, the court found its analysis: "[T]he law in
defamation cases has been for centuries that publication takes place
where and when the contents of the publication, oral or spoken, are seen
and heard, (i.e. made manifest to) and comprehended by the reader or
hearer, 0 2 and, as such, "[b]old assertions that the Internet is unlike other
systems do not lead to the abandonment of the analysis that the law has
traditionally and reasonably followed to reach just conclusions.' ' 23 The
decision was upheld by the High Court of Australia on December 10,
2002.124
The court noted that: "once published on the Internet material can be received anywhere, and
it does not lie within the competence of the publisher to restrict the reach of its publication."
The court further explained: "The difficulties are obvious. An injunction to restrain definition
in NSW [New South Wales] is designed to ensure compliance with the laws of NSW, and to
protect the rights of plaintiffs, as those rights are defined by the law of NSW. Such an injunc-
tion is not designed to superimpose the law of NSW relating to defamation on every other
state, territory, and country of the world. Yet that would be the effect of an order restraining
publication on the Internet. It is not to be assumed that the law of defamation is coextensive
with that of NSW, and indeed, one knows that it is not. It may well be that, according to the
law of the Bahamas, Tashakistan, or Mongolia, the defendant has an unfettered right to pub-
lish the material. To make an order interfering with such a right would exceed the proper
limits of the use of the injunctive power of this court." Id.
120. Gutnick v. Dow Jones & Co. Inc. (2001) VSC 305, available at http://
www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/vicVSC/2001/305.html (last visited Apr. 3, 2003).
121. See, e.g. Editorial, A Blow to Online Freedom, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11, 2002, at A34
("Now comes a ruling from Australia's highest court in a libel case that could strike a devastat-
ing blow to free speech online .... To subject distant providers of online content to sanctions
in countries intent on curbing free speech-or even to 190 different libel laws--is to under-
mine the Internet's viability. Publications must be held accountable for their actions where
they operate. The Internet's universal reach should not be reason to force publishers to censor
themselves'").
122. Gutnick, (2001) VSC 305, 60.
123. Gutnick, (2001) VSC 305, 70.
124. Dow Jones & Company Inc. v Gutnick (2002) HCA 56, available at http://
www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/high-ct/2002/56.html (last visited Apr. 3, 2003).
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C. The Appeal and Limits of Effects-based Analysis
As symbolic gestures asserting the import of national law in cyber-
space, these displays of regulatory power collectively demonstrate that
courts are emboldened and willing to extend jurisdiction to companies
that do not expressly target or direct themselves toward a particular state.
These cases give shape to the prediction that "courts and policy makers
are likely to bias toward asserting jurisdiction where harm has been ex-
perienced locally."'' 25 Yet, unlike the French court in Yahoo!, these
decisions fail to consider or take into account the cost of indirectly man-
dating technological solutions to permit the avoidance of the relevant
jurisdiction.
As a tool of the courts, the use of an effects-based test is most
controversial when it arises in the context of expressive subject-matter
disputes. Yet, it has been embraced beyond the context of speech by
states in order to support their numerous communications-oriented
regulatory goals. In many areas of global information regulation, in
particular intellectual property, the U.S. has been particularly
uncompromising when asserting jurisdiction upon foreign actors.1
6
Because the effects-test permits the long-arm extension of the law, its
application is compelling whenever the perceived local harm is seen by a
court to be too great to ignore.
125. Geist, supra note 5, at 1357.
126. For example, in Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., et al. v. iCraveT, et al., No. 00-
120, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1013 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 28, 2000), a U.S. court dismissed Canadian
copyright law in ordering iCraveTV to cease broadcasting on the web. Similarly, tfie U.S.
sought unsuccessfully to enforce the anti-circumvention provisions of the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act (DMCA) against a Russian software company on the grounds that the sale of a
program that disabled encryption of Adobe eBook documents had violated a U.S. company's
copyrights. See Verdict Seen As Blow to DMCA, Wired, Dec. 18, 2002 (describing the U.S.
failed effort to prosecute the Russian company, Elcomsoft, after having dropped charges
against its employee, a Russian computer programmer who was the first person to be charged
under the controversial digital-copyright law). From on-line gambling cases to domain name
disputes, U.S. courts "have repeatedly applied U.S. law to foreign operators with little
consideration for the governing law of the other jurisdiction." Michael Geist, Everybody
Wants to Rule the Web, 2 COMMUNICATIONS LAW IN TRANSITION NEWSLETTER, at http://
pcmlp.socleg.ox.ac.uk/transition/issue2-2/geist.htm (last visited Apr. 3, 2003). Congress has
also been willing to legislate extraterritoriality. The Children's On-line Protection Act
establishes stringent requirements for websites that target children and applies not only to U.S.
websites, but to foreign content providers that target U.S. children. Similarly, "the European
Union's Data Privacy Directive prohibits the transfer of personal data to non-EU countries that
do not employ adequate privacy protections," and has spurred the development and enactment
of national regulations elsewhere. Id. These developments have led one critic to note that the
U.S. "cannot be hypocritical and condemn the Yahoo! decision and then only weeks later
extend its jurisdiction over iCrave TV." William Crane, The World-wide Jurisdiction: An
Analysis of Over-inclusive Internet Jurisdictional Law and an Attempt by Congress to Fix it,
11 J. ART & ENT. LAW 267, 307 (2001).
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The trend toward effects-based analysis is made more troubling by
the willingness of courts to apply jurisdiction without assessing the rela-
tive merits of other courts. As Michael Geist notes, combined with an
effects-based approach for Internet jurisdiction, "is a lack of deference
toward other courts and legal norms such as forum non conveniens and
international comity.... [C]ourts worldwide are reluctant to surrender
jurisdiction, particularly if doing so means that local law will either be
applied by a foreign court or not at all."'27 The widening scope of juris-
dictional competency applied to the Internet may result in jurisdictional
forum shopping, with plaintiffs seeking the jurisdictional forum of the
country that is most plaintiff-friendly, rather than the one that is most
appropriate for a given case.
While the effects-based test reflects the interconnected nature of a
global network, it sets the groundwork for conflicting claims to
competence.' 2' The long-standing difficulty of a test which results both in
jurisdictional uncertainty and overdetermination is heightened in the on-
line environment, given the fluidity and rapidity of information
transmission. Without preventive action limiting the reach of publication,
Internet-based activity is polymorphous in impact and can be said to
create some effects in most jurisdictions. Absent network-wide
geographic filtering, "the Internet's globalizing force [will continue to
demand] an exponential increase in requiring the application of such
principles.' ' 29 The value of the Internet as a vehicle for equalizing speech
for small and large publishers alike should compel courts to be sensitive
to the burdens of limiting, either indirectly or directly, the scope of on-
line publication. While geo-location tools will be part of the solution,
courts must take the ability of users to implement such tools into
account, considering whether limiting the scope of targeting publication
would be too burdensome.
127. Michael Geist, The Legal Implications of the Yahoo! Inc. Nazi Memorabilia Dis-
pute; An Interview with Professor Michael Geist, JURISCOM.NET, Jan. 18, 2001, at
www.juriscom.net/en/uni/doc/yahoo/geist.htm (last visited Apr. 3, 2003).
128. The obstacles inherent in the effects-test as a theoretically and practically deficient
solution to extraterritorial disputes has long been noted, as W. Michael Reisman remarks:
"[T]he effects theory only settles international jurisdictional conflicts when the vector of ef-
fects is unidirectional and originates in a normative vacuum .... The effects theory and its
various epicycles--contacts and interests-cut to the core issue in jurisdictional conflicts, but
'effects' has proved less a theory for decision than a restatement of the essential problem.
Moreover, the theory and its corollaries were premised on a bilateral paradigm: a dispute be-
tween two states over the competence to make or apply law to persons, things or events over
which control was simultaneously or sequentially shared. The apparently inexorable advance
of interdependence has rendered that paradigm obsolete as both an explanatory and deonto-
logical or prescriptive technique." Reisman, supra note 10, at xvii-xix.
129. Bauchner, supra note 106, at 695.
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In contrast to an effects-based test, a targeting-based approach-that
measures the deliberate efforts of on-line content providers to target a
given area-has been adopted by some courts as a more nuanced juris-
dictional standard intended to permit greater certainty for content
providers."' Like the passive-active sliding scale, a targeting analysis
seeks to distinguish between the mere publishing of on-line material and
"something more." It recovers the ability of the passive-versus-active test
to distinguish among the intent of on-line actors, but would appear to
provide greater certainty regarding liability to content providers than a
sliding scale. 3' It could even take into account the attempts of content
providers to jurisdictionally avoid targeting the forum 
state.'3 2
Flipped again, while a targeting test offers a seeming step forward to-
ward providing greater certainty for on-line publishers, it fails to capture
the true polymorphous impact (read: effect) of online communications. As
a solution for commercial actors within the U.S., it would, within a system
of uniform national law, represent a step forward in reconciling federalism
and cyberspace. However, it demands too much forbearance by foreign
states that no longer desire to be adversely impacted by culturally offen-
sive content. Were disputes to hinge on whether a site was targeting a
specific forum, regulatory uncertainty would merely shift toward a given
court's definition of "targeting" and a case-by-case assessment of the de-
130. For example, in Bancroft & Masters, Inc. v. Augusta National Inc., 223 F3d 1082,
1087 (9th Cir. 2000), a dispute over the "masters.com" domain name, the Ninth Circuit
stepped beyond an effects-based analysis to require "something more," namely "targeting":
We have said that there must be "something more," but have not spelled out what
that something more must be. We now conclude that "something more" is what the
Supreme Court described as "express aiming" at the forum state. Express aiming is
a concept that in the jurisdictional context hardly defines itself. From the available
cases, we deduce that the requirement is satisfied when the defendant is alleged to
have engaged in wrongful conduct targeted at a plaintiff whom the defendant knows
to be a resident of the forum state.
Id. at 206. See also American Information Corp. v. American Infometrics, Inc., 139 E Supp.
2d 696 (D. Md. 2001) (finding that a web presence without targeting of the forum in question,
Maryland, did not yield personal jurisdiction).
131. See Geist, supra note 5 (proposing a targeting-based approach to transnational ju-
risdiction). Similarly, the American Bar Association Internet Jurisdiction project, which
released a report in 2000, recommended targeting as a means of addressing on-line jurisdic-
tion. See American Bar Association, Achieving Legal and Business Order in Cyberspace: A
Report on Global Jurisdiction Issues Created By the Internet (2000) at http://www.abanet.org/
buslaw/cyber/initiatives/draft.rtf (last visited Apr. 3, 2003).
132. Geist suggests that a targeting-based approach would be a first step, standing along-
side an assessment of ]) contractual agreements, such as forum selection clauses,
2) jurisdictional avoidance technologies rooted in geo-location, and 3)actual or implied
knowledge, such as the exchange of information or commercial goods into a foreign forum.
See Geist, supra note 5, at 1386. Together, Geist anticipates, rightly in my view, that these
factors would better anticipate the ability of on-line actors to foresee the regulations imposed
upon them relative to their actions.
Spring 2003]
436 Michigan Telecommunications and Technology Law Review [Vol. 9:395
fendant's actions. This discretion is likely to reintroduce the difficulties
inherent in the subjective application of an effects-test, as courts will be
likely to interpret "targeting" in a way that befits their own national in-
terest. In the unlikely case that a common definition could be agreed
upon, then sites that failed to "target" a forum state would be immu-
nized, leaving states legally defenseless.
Despite its limitations, then, national courts assessing jurisdiction
over local harm originating abroad are likely to continue to favor the
broad jurisdictional reach of the effects-based test over more refined al-
ternatives. On a case-by-case basis "courts and policy makers may have
a bias towards protecting local citizenry from commercial or content-
based harm," even if from a distanced perspective, "the issue is further
complicated by the fact that all countries face the same concern.""'3 Ac-
cordingly, while a country may wish to protect its own citizens by
asserting jurisdiction over out-of-country entities, it would prefer that
other countries not exert the same authority over its own citizens and
companies. Theoretically, a jurisdictional quid-pro-quo might develop,
whereby a reciprocal exchange and recognition of state sovereignty
would balance efforts on both sides.' 34
When it comes to local values, however, states are unlikely to yield
on substantive aspects of law to some form enlightened collective inter-
est. As we consider the integration of local regulations within the global
network, it is fitting to interpret Yahoo! and its progeny as expressions of
a European regulatory methodology, opposed to the United States' cul-
tural and technological hegemony of the on-line world. Comprehending
the impetus that drives the unilateral regulation of speech illustrates that
the conflicting regulatory goals of states will continue to represent an
intractable problem in the maintenance of a shared communications in-
frastructure.
133. Geist, supra note 5, at 1358.
134. Lawrence Lessig utilizes the example of Minnesota's desire to enforce state anti-
gambling laws to illustrate the dynamic of ajurisdictional quid pro quo in which states support
each others regulatory aims:
Why would any other jurisdiction want to carry out Minnesota's regulation? The
answer is that they would not if this were the only regulation at stake. Minnesota
wants to protect its citizens from gambling, but New York may want to protect its
citizens against the misuse of private data. The European Union may share New
York's objective; Utah may share Minnesota's. Each state has its own stake in con-
trolling certain behaviors, and these behaviors are different. But the key is this: the
same architecture that enables Minnesota to achieve its regulatory end can also help
other states achieve their regulatory ends. And this can initiate a kind of quid pro
quo between jurisdictions.
LESSIG, supra note 11, at 55.
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IV. GLOBALIZATION AND THE REGULATION
OF EXPRESSIVE COMMODITIES
A. Redefining Pluralism and Public Order
As Daniel Farber notes, "Internet issues are often, in the end, merely
examples of the stresses of globalization.""'3 Disputes over international
jurisdiction concerning subjective subject-matter disputes demonstrate
that it is impossible to extricate international legal decision-making from
the politico-economic and cultural aspects of globalization. The Internet
throws into relief the diversity and dissonance of the perspectives that
characterize our world, and in doing so heightens the difficulties
autonomous nations face in striving to define themselves; forcing the
international community "to face anew the tension between pluralism
and order."'
136
The contests over the extraterritorial enforcement of on-line regula-
tion mirror debates over the widening scope and intrusive impact of
America's extraterritorial enforcement of its domestic antitrust laws dur-
ing the first half of the twentieth century. The development of antitrust
laws provides an inverted case study for the expansion and retraction of
state power and regulatory priorities across borders. Initially, American
antitrust law was rooted in isolationism and courts interpreted the
Sherman Act to extend only so far as the nation's borders.'37 As the U.S.
became increasingly implicated in the world economy, it sought to fur-
ther its economic goals and the benefits of enhanced free trade.
Isolationism was displaced, as American courts gradually extended their
sphere of influence under the law. An effects-based jurisdictional test
that connected actions in foreign states with their economic impact state-
side enabled U.S. courts to redefine the relationship between U.S.
judicial power and activities overseas.
The trend culminated in United States v. Aluminum Co. of America,
(Alcoa)'38 in which Justice Holmes, sitting in designation for the Su-
preme Court, "extended the reach of antitrust legislation significantly,
holding that wherever there is an action which, if performed within the
United States, would be illegal, combined with an effect on U.S. imports
or exports and the intention to produce that effect, then the application of
135. Daniel Farber, Symposium: Expressive Commerce in Cyberspace: Public Goods,
Network Effects, and Free Speech, 16 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 789, 808 (2000).
136. Development: V1. Cyberspace Regulation and the Discourse of State Sovereignty,
112 HARV. L. REv. 1577, 1703 (1999) [hereinafter Cyberspace Regulation and the Discourse
of State Sovereignty].
137. American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 357-58 (1909).
138. 148 F.2d 416 (2nd Cir. 1945).
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U.S. antitrust jurisdiction will be appropriate."'39 The advancing extrater-
ritorial stretch of U.S. law correlated with the apex of its global power:
This dramatic increase in antitrust scope as set forth in Alcoa
and the many cases following it, was perfectly appropriate to the
time period. The United States was at the peak of its power;
therefore, antitrust statutes could reach farther than ever before.
Since the United States was driving the world's economy, it was
logical for it to be able to impose its ideas of unfair competition
as well. In defining and maintaining the marketplace, the United
States added its own antitrust ideals.14
The gradual expansion of American antitrust power through the use
of the effects-test set the stage for the contemporary jurisdictional con-
flicts described here; which are equally rooted upon economic
interdependence, cultural friction, and political differences. It is
noteworthy that following the highpoint of broad American antitrust
jurisdiction has followed in the present moment a period of nominal in-
ternational cooperation and harmonization, 4' along with the occasional
expression of regulatory autonomy by European states.'42
In an era of new technologies, where American free speech advo-
cates cheerfully note that the Internet is likely to increase "cultural
diffusion," Yahoo! and the related cases discussed above show that other
cultures have seen new communications technology as part of "the as-
sault of U.S. cultural imperialism.' ' 43 As we have seen, the development
of the Internet as a global medium coincided with U.S. control of the
technical infrastructure. While the initial technological state of affairs
originated largely in technical and not governmental decisions, it should
be no surprise that the technologies have been interpreted as exporting
American values and that European states have reinvigorated the effects-
test as countervailing mechanism.
Despite postmodern assertions that non-geographic communities
will replace regional affiliations and values, Yahoo! reflects a future of
on-line regulatory struggles that will proceed against the backdrop of an
139. Courtney G. Lytle, A Hegemonic Interpretation of Extraterritorial Jurisdiction in
Antitrust: From American Banana to Hartford Fire, 24 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 41, 58
(1997).
140. Id. at 59.
141. See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764 (1992); Timberlane Lumber
Co. v. Bank of America Nat'l Trust and Sav. Ass'n, 549 F.2d 597, 613-15 (9th Cir. 1976).
142. See, e.g., Case COMP/M.2220, General Electric/Honeywell v. Commission (2001),
available at http://europa.eu.int/commcompetition/mergers/cases/decisions/m2220_en.pdf
(last visited Apr. 3, 2003).
143. Froomkin, supra note 64, at 1109 (citing Henry H. Perritt, Jr, The Internet is
Changing International Law, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV 997, 1035-36 (1998)).
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Internet that continues to blend an at once borderless and nationally-
divided globe. Joel Reidenberg notes:
The Yahoo! decision reflects a shifting economic and political
power struggle on the Internet that suggests that the American
[approach to regulation] is rapidly becoming a minority view. In
fact, up until 2000, the United States had an absolute market
share of Internet content and use. But, during 2000, non-U.S.
use grew dramatically. At mid-year, only a slight majority of
web use was in English. By the end of 2000, fifty-five percent of
web traffic originated outside the U.S. And in France alone, the
number of Internet users rose sixty-five percent to 6.8 million
web users.1"
Given the diversification of the on-line population, France's protec-
tive action and the decisions following it can be understood as a response
to the "indirect unilateralism" of the United States' governance of the
Internet.' ' From the perspective of Europe, the Internet has been an
American invention and medium-at both the underlying technical level
and the substantive content level. It is not surprising that the intrusive
nature of new communications technology has brought with it many of
the familiar problems of globalization. As a conduit for commerce and
information, the Internet may significantly impact the formation and
maintenance of cultural norms: "By reducing communication barriers
between people, it can have effects not unlike those of lowered trade bar-
riers. Like World Trade Organization (WTO), the Internet is a powerful
instrument of globalization ... [at the same time] the Internet threatens
what limited power local communities have to maintain their cultural
integrity.""
The cultural impact of new technology is heightened by the primary
role of information goods within the global communications network.
One cannot understand Yahoo! and the related rulings without acknowl-
edging the privileged position of expressive commodities-
"economically valuable information transmissions"47-in the on-line
environment. On-line transmissions that serve both a commercial and
informational role collapse the boundary between speech and commerce.
144. Reidenberg, supra note 2, at 263 (citing Les Internautes: Les Langues Utilisees Sur
le Net, LE JOURNAL Du NET, 2002, at http://www.joumaldunet.comcc/cc intermde3.shtml
(last visited Apr. 3, 2003); and 55 Percent of All Web Traffic Worldwide Comes from Outside of
the United States, STATMARKET, Jan. 23, 2001, at http://www.statmarket.com/cgi-
bin/sm.cgi?sm&eature&statO12301 (last visited Apr. 3, 2003)).
145. Franz C. Mayer, Europe and the Internet: The Old World and the New Medium, 11
EJIL 161 (2000).
146. Farber, supra note 135, at 792.
147. Id. at 789-90.
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While "the commercialization of information is nothing new. What is
new is the extent to which commerce now involves information ex-
changes rather than transfers of material objects."'48 Yahoo! demonstrates
the fact that "trade issues and emerging First Amendment issues are be-
ginning to bear at least ... a family resemblance,"1 49 an overlap that
complicates the question of extraterritorial Internet regulation.
Again, the common criticism that the U.S. is able through its relative
power to "determine much of the public world order," is heightened in
the online context, where the United States has controlled the techno-
logical infrastructure of the medium. 5° Because of the pattern of the
Internet's growth, individuals from the United States and like-minded
countries established most currently existing norms.' Whereas before
technologists "largely defined important information policy rules
through technical choices and decisions without political intervention
... Yahoo! shifts this rule-making power back to political representa-
tives. In particular, Europe has demanded a place for its own regulatory
methodology in considerations regarding the development of the net-
work.
, , 152
B. A Safe Harbor for Hate Speech
It is no surprise that the European dissatisfaction with the U.S. ap-
proach to regulation finds its most vocal expression, exemplified by the
Yahoo! case, in criticisms that the U.S. constitution affords a haven for
hate speech.'53 This area represents in starkest terms the status of the
United States as an outlier, at once a part of and removed from the inter-
national community. While the European community has developed a
substantive body of law and international standards regarding the incite-
148. Id. at 807.
149. Id.
150. James C. Hathaway, America, Defender of Democratic Legitimacy, 11 EJIL 121,
123 (2000).
151. See Timothy Wu, Note, Cyberspace Sovereignty? The Internet and the International
System, 10 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 647 (1997).
152. Reidenberg, supra note 2, at 272. In the context of privacy, the European commu-
nity has taken a parallel collective stance in opposition to the United States with the adoption
of stringent privacy regulations. See, e.g., Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and
of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the Protection of Individuals With Regard to Processing
of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, 1995 O.J. (L 281).
153. See, e.g., Lisa Guernsey, Mainstream Sites Serve as Portals to Hate, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 30, 2000, at G I; see also Alexander Tsesis, Hate in Cyberspace: Regulating Hate Speech
on the Internet, 38 SAN DIEGo L. REV. 817, 838 (2001) (describing how "[h]ate groups have
found a haven in the United States for their Internet sites because the Supreme Court has sig-
nificantly limited the government's ability to prohibit the distribution of racist, provocative
materials").
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ment of hatred in the furtherance of equality, the United States has been
at best a partial participant.
Although the United States has become a party to several interna-
tional human rights conventions that require a more aggressive approach
to bigotry and hate, as described below, it has done so consistent with its
policy of adapting numerous reservations, understandings, and declara-
tions (RUDs) to all treaties. The RUDs seek to contract out of the
objectionable provisions of these instruments that might be deemed to
conflict with the Constitution, in particular with regards to speech. For
example, the United States has ratified the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights,'T 4 an accord that is now ratified by or binding
on over 140 of the world's states. The Covenant articulates under Article
20 an international standard in opposition to discrimination and bigotry,
requiring that for all signatories, "any advocacy of national, racial or re-
ligious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or
violence shall be prohibited by law."'55 Faced with that duty, in 1992,
some twenty-three years after this international treaty came into force,
the U.S. government attached a reservation to its ratification of the treaty
stating: "Article 20 does not authorize or require legislation or other ac-
tion by the United States that would restrict the right of free speech and
association protected by the Constitution and laws of the United
States."'56
Similarly, the International Covenant on the Elimination of All
Forms of Racial Discrimination,'57 which has been in force since 1969,
was not ratified by the United States until 1994. 5' Under Article 4 of the
convention, states are required to make it an offense punishable by law
to disseminate ideas based on racial superiority or hatred. It also requires
states to declare illegal and to prohibit racist organizations and to make it
an offence to belong to such associations. Unsurprisingly, the United
States has entered a reservation with respect to Article 4. 41, that stands
in the way of full implementation. '59 The reservation states that the
154. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S.
171.
155. Id. art. 20, 999 U.N.T.S. at 178.
156. 138 CONG. REC. 8,070 (1992).
157. Mar. 12, 1969, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 [hereinafter Race Convention].
158. 140 CONG. REc. 12,185 (1994).
159. Article 4 provides in relevant part:
States Parties condemn all propaganda and all organizations which are based on ideas or
theories of superiority of one race or group of persons of one colour or ethnic origin, or which
attempt to justify or promote racial hatred and discrimination in any form, and undertake to
adopt immediate and positive measures designed to eradicate all incitement to, or acts of, such
discrimination and, to this end, with due regard to the principles embodied in the Universal
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United States does not accept any obligations to restrict the rights of
speech, expression, and association. '60
The friction between the United States' laissez faire approach to ob-
jectionable content and the European approach is reinforced as the
European community strives to translate the distinct commitments of its
regulatory framework and political ideals-a focus on localism and hu-
man rights-into the future.16 ' This perspective is articulated, for
example, in the words of the French Council of State in a 1998 report on
the regulatory options for Internet:'
62
The point is to prove, once again, is the ability of our Old World
to imagine tomorrow's world, given our continent's cultural di-
versity and attachment to the defense of human rights. The
general philosophy behind this report might be summed up by
the objective whereby digital networks become a space for
"world civility," civility being defined as "the art of living to-
gether" From the European perspective, while the balkanization
Declaration of Human Rights and the rights expressly set forth in article 5 of this Convention,
inter alia:
(a) Shall declare an offence punishable by law all dissemination of ideas based on
racial superiority or hatred, incitement to racial discrimination, as well as all acts of
violence or incitement to such acts against any race or group of persons of another
colour or ethnic origin, and also the provision of any assistance to racist activities,
including the financing thereof;
(b) Shall declare illegal and prohibit organizations, and also organized and all other
propaganda activities, which promote and incite racial discrimination, and shall
recognize participation in such organizations or activities as an offence punishable
by law;
(c) Shall not permit public authorities or public institutions, national or local, to
promote or incite racial discrimination.
Race Convention, supra note 157.
160. 140 CONG. REC. 12,185 (1994).
161. Notably, outside of Internet regulation, the U.S. has embraced an expressed com-
mitment to localism as a foundational core of its communications regulatory policy. This
normative significance of localism is evidenced, for example, in the "must-carry" rules at
issue in the Turner Broadcasting cases. See Turner Broadcasting System v. FCC, 512 U.S.
622 (1994) [hereinafter Turner I]; and Turner Broadcasting System v. FCC, 117 S. Ct. 1174
(1997) [hereinafter Turner II]. In the Turner Broadcasting cases, the Court split 5-4 in 1994,
and again in 1997, on whether rules requiring cable operators to carry local broadcast signals
on demand was content regulation. A majority of the Court found they were not, and sustained
the regulations as justified by a substantial governmental interest. See Turner I, 512 U.S. at
662-63; Turner II, 117 S. Ct. at 1186-89, 1195-97.
162. Conseil d'Etat, Internet et les rjaux numeriquis 14 (July 2, 1998) available at
http://www.intemet.gouv.fr/francais/textesref/rapce98/accueil.htm (last visited Apr. 3, 2003).
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of the Internet might not be desirable, the American privileging
of the market has had a detrimental impact of cultural integrity.1
63
While the Internet may have been most closely associated with the
United States, the transition away from U.S.-centric norms necessitates as
well a shift away from the U.S. predominance over "Internet governance."
There is a mounting pressure for the American government to forfeit its
control over the Internet's technical infrastructure.' 64 The Yahoo! dispute
and similar cases "place pressure on the predominant economic rationale
of the debate on Internet governance to take account of human rights and
the regional dimension of Internet regulation.' 65 While virtual borders will
serve as part of the transition toward the increased relevancy of national
regulation, their impact should not be overstated. An interconnected net-
work is not an American interest, but a global interest; a geo-politically
divided Internet would be sure to facilitate national governance, but would
come at the cost of the World Wide Web.
V. A DYNAMIC MODEL OF ONLINE REGULATORY IMPACT
A. Understanding Technology as a Regulatory Constraint
To return to our primary question: Can the use of extraterritorial
jurisdiction to regulate speech on the Internet be both a manageable and
efficient means of utilizing state power? As should now be clear, the
approaching transitions in the on-line network infrastructure necessitate
an integrated model that reflects the mutual interdependence of actors
within a global network, the friction arising from competing policy-
making agendas, and the variety of ways in which states are able to
163. Id. Within the European community, the importance of cultural integrity and local-
ism has been reflected in another area of media regulation through the Television Without
Frontiers Directive. The "Television without Frontiers" Directive, Council Directive No.
89/552, 1989 O.J. (L 298) 23 (amended 1997), establishes the legal framework for "the free
movement of television broadcasting services in the European Union, in order to promote the
development of a European market in broadcasting and related activities." The European
Commission, Audiovisual Policy, at http://europa.eu.int/comm/avpolicy/exterm/coe_en.htm
(last modified Feb. 19, 2001). Article 4 of the Directive has received considerable criticism for
its programming quota provision, which calls for all channels to run at least fifty-one percent
of television programming from sources within the EC. See Kevin M. McDonald, How Would
You Like Your Television: With or Without Borders and With or Without Culture-A New Ap-
proach to Media Regulation in the European Union, 22 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1991 (1999)
(discussing the effectiveness of television broadcasting regulations as a means to effectuate the
promotion and protection of a pan-European culture). Confronting the transition to digitaliza-
tion, the directive grapples openly with maintaining local values-here, the common culture
of the European community-in confrontation with American cultural goods.
164. See, e.g., Mayer, supra note 145.
165. Id. at 169.
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effectuate regulatory goals. A model that takes into account each of these
factors will take us closer to a true assessment of the assertion that, in an
era of bordering technologies, the impact of unilateral regulatory moves
in the online world can be effectively cabined. Yochai Benkler offers us
such a model, challenging us to reconsider the impact of state-based
jurisdictional decision-making on the development of the network
considered as a whole.'6
As Benkler shows, regulatory spillover arising from expressive regu-
lation merits distinctive treatment within internal national policy given
the interdependent nature of the digital network. Whereas the application
of state-based law demonstrates that Internet users are not removed from
the real world, the impact of national regulations on individuals will de-
pend upon the extent to which cross-border on-line actors remain affixed
to one another through the network. To the extent that they remain inter-
connected, the regulatory impact of national regulations will continue to
be deeply felt by other states.
By approaching Internet regulation as a dynamic system, Benkler
shows that on-line activities are controlled by the intersection of three
factors: law, technology, and behavioral adaptations. 67 These elements
interact with one another to "constrain the parameters of human behavior
that is bound up with the technology.' 68 Such an approach, through its
inclusion of technology's ability to transmit values through behavioral
constraints, adapts a broader definition of what constitutes regulation in
the on-line world than the conventional assessment of legal regulation,
with its focus on the interplay of law and behavior (and sometimes
norms).
Stepping beyond Goldsmith's inattention to the distinctive attributes
of online communications, Benkler's approach is founded upon the
premise that the Internet is a global digital network, and that therefore
"the incorporation of values of one nation into the technology of com-
munication shared by many displaces those other nations, while a nation
that refrains from such incorporation is exposed to communications that
implement the values of another."' 69 Within a bilateral system, law and
behavior constrain one another and spillover impact is relatively con-
tained. In contrast, "the dynamic causal relationship between law and
technology means that many more decisions about local law are trans-
166. Benkler, supra note 3.
167. Id. at 173-75.
168. Id. at 176. See also Yochai Benkler, Communications Infrastructure Regulation and
the Distribution of Control over Content, 22 TELECOMM. POL'Y 384 (1998); and Yochai
Benkler, Overcoming Agoraphobia: Building a Commons in a Digitally Networked Environ-
ment, 11 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 287 (1998).
169. Benkler, supra note 3, at 174.
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lated, in a digitally networked globe, into behavioral constraints in other
nations."' 70 Critically, when technology serves as a "means of transmit-
ting the values of one nation as behavioral constraints in another, it




Suppose, for example, that following the French prohibition Yahoo!
elected to continue providing Nazi memorabilia. Jurisdiction-avoidance
could be expected to raise the cost of material, due the internalization of
Yahoo's costs for filtering out French users. Goldsmith understands this
cost-the internalization of social and financial costs of discrete actions
by multinational actors-to be the main consequence of unilateral regu-
lations. However, as Benkler points out, to effectively prevent materials
from entering states where they are not permitted will require "extensive
self-identification of users before they receive access to information. ' '7
This will "change how the server interacts with all users, from all juris-
dictions, in order to keep the server safe from liability in a single
jurisdiction"' 73 Regulatory spillover, therefore, occurs at the basic level
of "the relationship that everyone, everywhere, has with the informa-
tion.' ' 4 Not only does regulation make it more difficult for everyone to
receive the material in question, but it makes it harder to sustain compet-
ing regulatory goals. For example, consider the impact that a national
identification system implemented by on-line content providers would
have on the competing regulatory principles of anonymity and privacy.
In a dynamic system like the Internet, such a "quasi-Coasian recip-
rocity of effect of encoding values as behavioural constraints is
unavoidable '' 75 In a digitally networked environment, states can enter at
either the level of law or technology to impact the system and establish
rules for everyone. The important point is that, in a playable system,
states are just as likely to find their own regulatory goals stifled by this
process as they are likely to see them fulfilled. Our shared technological
infrastructure entails that "regulatory costs that ordinarily affect only a
particular jurisdiction's residents, [on the Internet allow] a community to
impose these costs on distant populations and individuals that adhere to
differing normative frameworks.' 76
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 178.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 174.
176. Cyberspace Regulation and the Discourse of State Sovereignty, supra note 136, at
1696.
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B. Yahoo! Reconsidered
Benkler's model enables us to focus on the French court's recourse to
technology in Yahoo!, and to conceptualize it as a fundamentally
preferable means of regulating on-line behavior from the perspective of
the harmed party. Yet, it qualifies the inherent attractiveness of "virtual
borders" as a regulatory tactic for the international community by
highlighting the deeper indirect impact of such a move. If our regulatory
methodology incorporates technological constraints, geo-location
technologies are an imperfect fix. By "imposing the development of
technical capacity to accommodate competing democratically chosen rules
in the network infrastructure" ' 7 7 Yahoo! disturbs Goldsmith's presumption
that Internet content providers will not be subject to any regulation other
than in territories where they have a financial or physical presence. In
other words, even virtual borders, when imposed on out-of-state actors,
can be understood as a unilateral regulation impacting other states and
their definition of free expression.
The dynamic model demonstrates the need for continued concern
over unilateral actions, beyond mere First Amendment rationales focused
on a regulatory race-to-the-bottom. From the perspective of efficiency,
spillover minimization makes good policy as states contemplate a variety
of regulatory endeavors in areas such as privacy and intellectual property
as well as the control of expressive content. These regulatory "ventures
are likely to result in dissension [among international players] regarding
their appropriateness, necessity, applicability and impact, as each at-
tempts to harness the power of the Internet according to the regulating
state's own self-interest."1 78 Without cooperation, such efforts "may result
in the promotion of numerous antagonistic ideals each advocated by a
[particular] sovereign state interest."'
' 79
Ultimately, the interconnected nature of networked life, makes the
structuring of the network a "valid normative concern for everyone,"' 80
and favors an approach to the Internet as itself an international regime.
The impending internationalization of Internet rules and design features
necessitates a deeper consideration of the impact on the international
system than recognized by decisions like Yahoo!. It requires an applica-
tion of a principle of cooperation, a duty on the part of nations to include
in both their legislative processes and judicial decision making-for
177. Reidenberg, supra note 2, at 272.
178. Joshua S. Bauchner, Note and Comment, State Sovereignty and the Globalizing Ef-
fect of the Internet: A Case Study of the Privacy Debate, 26 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 689, 716
(2000).
179. Id. at 717.
180. Id.
Regulating Speech Across Borders
their own benefit-the effects of their actions on other nations. To take
cooperation seriously, national courts should favor strategies that aspire
to be least disruptive to the global network and the international regula-
tory system. The demand from the European community for the U.S. to
acknowledge the Internet as a global medium-to concede that national
governments have legitimate interests in regulating certain activities and
content-entails a parallel acknowledgment that their regulatory actions
overseas will have a recursive impact on all on-line regulatory players,
including themselves.'
VI. BEYOND UNILATERALISM
To assess the impact of extraterritorial Internet regulation from the
perspective of the international order is not to devalue the interests of
states in protecting their respective domestic affairs. Rather, it is to ask
how the application of the international law of jurisdiction may "best
answer[] the institutional needs of the international judicial system" and
most "effectively coordinate the allocation of international regulatory
authority."'82 The standoff between America's indirect unilateralism and
the European response rooted in effects-based jurisdiction is unlikely to
promote the overall collective good; instead, we should favor the techni-
cal evolution of the medium as a collaborative enterprise.
Clearly, as Goldsmith notes, "there is no legal or moral principle that
requires [states] to yield local control over its territory in order to ac-
commodate the users of the Internet in other countries."'83 However, if
even in a future era of virtual borders state decisions remain mutually
implicated, the question becomes what is the most efficient and democ-
ratic means for states to control order within their territory. While
unilateral prescriptions focused on an extraterritorial action's local harm
are legitimate under international law, they may still adversely impact
the international system and its emergent development.
The likelihood is that, in the future, national courts will cease defer-
ring to the technological capacity of the medium, as it exists. Yet, "[t]he
181. The inherent attractiveness to national courts of the effects-based test for matters of
substantive normative conflicts can be flipped to capture the extension of national law into
foreign forums. See id. at 695 ("By extension, the 'effects test' also can be used to gauge the
effects of a foreign state's laws upon another state, as opposed to an entity's activity causing
effects within a forum warranting jurisdiction. In this capacity, the "effects test" is used to
determine infringements upon a state's sovereignty vis-A-vis another state's actions.") (citing
Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., 549 E2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976)).
182. Andrew L. Strauss, Beyond National Law: The Neglected Role of the International
Law of Personal Jurisdiction in Domestic Courts, 36 HARV. INT'L L. J. 373, 423 (1995).
183. Goldsmith, supra note 75, at 201.
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resulting panoply of conflicting laws is not likely to further the technol-
ogy's evolution or serve to benefit its users."'8 Ultimately, states must
recognize that, "because of the global characteristic of information and
its centrality to the modem economy, their own self-interest lies in com-
patible legal regimes, workable international standards, and global
cooperation.'
Admittedly nations face a difficult decision between over-inclusive
and inclusive measures. If they under-enforce as before, they will find
their regulatory goals are frustrated. If states choose to over-enforce,
then they encourage legal and political conflicts with other players in the
international system. However, a combination of cooperation, externally
with other states, and restraint, as an internal public policy, may lead to
enhanced cooperation overall.
In matters where consensus is possible, nations should come to
agreement and in areas-such as subjective subject-matter disputes-
where consensual substantive decision-making is unworkable nations
should use a variety of mechanisms to insulate themselves. The absence
of extraterritorial enforcement does not necessitate deferral to the per-
missive status quo; it favors instead the adoption of a regulatory
methodology that utilizes technical means to achieve national self-
regulation. Thus, future regulatory efforts, in order to conform with the
principles of international law and prevent conflict among states, should
depend in part upon state-based self-regulation toward the continued
evolution of the medium.
A. International Harmonization
The preferred method for obviating international regulatory conflict
is recourse to harmonization techniques and supranational decisions. As
many have argued, international cooperation regarding the implementa-
tion of on-line rules is possible through agreements about responsibility
for regulation or through harmonization of regulations themselves. In the
future, Internet regulation will require international arrangements that
transcend state borders and originate beyond independent state govern-
mental processes; collective efforts that arise either through private
enterprise by non-state entities, such as technical-standards bodies, or
governmental collaboration. In these areas, the Internet encourages the
internalization of international law.
Where the target of regulation is not controversial, consensus should
enable international cooperation to be achieved rapidly and in a compre-
184. Bauchner, supra note 106, at 717.
185. Fred H. Cate, Global Information Policymaking and Domestic Law, 1 IND. J.
GLOBAL LEG. STUD. 467, 487 (1994).
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hensive manner. Already, various harmonization strategies are being em-
ployed to address the challenges within the international community of
regulating on-line behavior. The most prominent example are the recent
agreements in the arena of intellectual property, securing the protection
of content holders rights in the on-line environment.'86 Similar efforts are
underway through the Draft Convention on Cybercrime-an Act touted
as the "first international computer crime agreement"-Currently being
negotiated by the United States and the 41-nation Council of Europe.'
87
Furthermore, the necessity for clarity in commercial transactions has
spurred international conversation about harmonizing jurisdictional law.
The proposed Hague Convention on International Jurisdiction has
sought, with opposition from U.S. business and consumer groups, to cre-
ate a set of internationally accepted principles.
When there is wide accordance on an issue, coordinated action
might not be necessary. Thus, there are a handful of issues, such as child
pornography and fraud, where there is widespread agreement on the
need for government involvement. Such near universal agreement, has
enabled "efforts by the [United States'] Federal Trade Commission and
other consumer protection agencies targeting Internet fraud, regardless
of its origin, [to] meet with little global criticism."'88
On the flipside, there are clear dangers inherent in harmonization.
Some harmonization efforts reflect coercion on the part of powerful na-
tions, rather than fair or efficient regulatory improvements. As we have
seen, the Internet, far from being an emergent self-ordering system, is
deeply dependent on the control of key players-in particular, those in
control of the fundamental design decisions. In the future, the burdens of
cooperation and restraint will likely fall upon the party with the most to
lose, namely, the United States. Even where the U.S. participates in in-
ternational decision-making, "Europeans suspect that public and private
interests in the U.S. are aiming at structuring the use of and the behavior
in the digital networks along American lines, which is associated with a
purely economic rationale."' 89 The U.S. impact on the WIPO treaty has
been criticized on precisely these grounds.' 9°
For the U.S. to protest the application of an effects-based test in the
context of free speech smacks with hypocrisy at a time when U.S. courts
186. See World Intellectual Property Organization Copyright Treaty, Dec.20, 1996, art.
14(1), 36 I.L.M. 65, 72. (adopted by the Diplomatic Conference at Geneva, outlining provi-
sions for protection of literary and artistic works in light of new technology).
187. See Jay Fisher, The Draft Convention on Cybercrime: Potential Constitutional Con-
flicts, 32 U. WEST. L.A. L. REv. 339 (2001).
188. Geist, supra note 126.
189. Mayer, supra note 145, at 150; and Counseil d'Etat supra note 162, at 13.
190. See Benkler, supra note 3, at 179-84.
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have found it convenient and suitable to apply U.S. law to foreign enti-
ties, in the case of intellectual property offenses,"' domain name
disputes,'92 and on-line gambling cases.' 93 Like their European brethren,
in each category, U.S. courts have found jurisdiction and applied na-
tional law without regard for the conflicting governing law of the
competing jurisdiction. In the future, to secure its own regulatory goals,
the U.S. must play with an even and balanced hand-especially if it
seeks to safeguard freedom of speech within its own borders.
B. Strategies for National Self-Enforcement
Harmonization will not be an effective or comprehensive response to
conflicts among regulations that reflect local values, and in such areas, it
can be said that "there are good reasons for regulatory differences among
nations."' 94 When it detracts from distinct normative considerations,
nations will understandably view harmonization at the substantive level
to detract from their sovereign interests.' 5 If there is indeed an
intractable conflict between a First Amendment approach and the
European approach that balances free speech against human dignity,
zoning the net may represent a substantial part of the solution. However,
countries that contest should be the ones to make the decision. If a
191. See supra note 126.
192. See, e.g., CNN v. CNNews.com, 162 F. Supp. 2d 484 (E.D. Va. 2001) (ruling that
under the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act (the "ACPA"), a ".com" Internet do-
main name holder located abroad could be subject to United States in rem jurisdiction based
on the location of the ".com" registry in the U.S., despite the fact that the registrant had no
contacts with the U.S.).
193. In the first decision by a U.S. court that online gambling violates state and federal
law, People v. World Interactive Gaming Corp., 714 N.YS.2d 844 (N.Y. County Sup. Ct. 1999)
(finding jurisdiction over business offering Internet gambling to New York residents), the court
reasoned that the company's Website created a "virtual casino within the user's computer
terminal within the user's computer terminal." Id. at 852.
194. Reisman, supra note 10, at xvi ("A government's fundamental purpose is to protect
its community. Protection is often conceived of in territorial and military terms, but what is
really at stake is the integrity of the social and economic processes that are the life of the na-
tional community").
195. Goldsmith argues that we may in fact transition toward more substantive harmoni-
zation on normative matters:
[W]e are likely to see soft harmonization of contested national regulatory regimes
before we see hard harmonization. With issues like privacy, consumer protection,
and free speech, the most feasible approach for harmonization in the short run is
through informal means such as informal enforcement agreements, targeted goals, a
softening of unilateral extraterritorial enforcement on a case-by-case basis and in-
formation sharing. These soft strategies can help to reduce regulatory difference,
and can lead to hard harmonization agreements.
Goldsmith, supra note 75, at 206. Given the deeply incompatible normative positions of states
exemplified by Yahoo!, I am less optimistic about the prospects for substantive internaliza-
tion-soft or hard.
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national government views regulation in the protection of local values as
sufficiently important to impose costs on the reception of information for
its citizens, then that government is the best situated to access the
relative costs and benefits of regulation.
When local values are at issue, unilateral actions against selected
Internet actors are likely to be inefficient and incomprehensive. Multina-
tionals are likely to adapt behavioral practices and technological means
to avoid undesirable jurisdictions. Yet, given the strict territorial limits on
enforcement, small actors who are deliberate in maintaining no assets or
contacts with a forum will continue to be a problem. As Michael Geist
notes: "Shutting down Nazi memorabilia websites on Yahoo! will not
eradicate Nazi materials from the Internet. The Internet is a vast space
and if there is demand, Web sites will meet that demand no matter how
objectionable the content.'' 96 Similarly, an additional and inevitable hur-
dle is the fact that some states will refrain from cooperation on
regulatory agreements through extradition or enforcement of court deci-
sions, entailing that harmonization will not itself be sufficient to protect
states' regulatory interests.
Protective action and spillover minimization is possible through na-
tional self-regulation. In particular, for content regulation, indirect
regulation enables states to protect their interests and community while
minimizing impact on the system overall. First, states can enforce their
laws against their own citizens and other persons within their territory,
punishing them for accessing materials deemed harmful to civil society.
Second, rather than mandate geo-location upon offensive publishers, it is
easier (albeit difficult and possibly politically unpopular) for a country to
limit its own citizens' access to the Internet. Some countries-such as
China and Saudi Arabia-"maintain control through government servers
that censor incoming news and information."' 97 Citizens, in such states, are
only allowed to access the internet through the government servers, and
"[p]enalties including imprisonment await citizens who use faxes, cell
phones, or codes to circumvent the government ISP."' 98 European countries
that found the extreme methods used by China and Saudi Arabia unpalat-
able could also explore less restrictive and more balanced measures, such
as requiring all private ISPs or users to install blocking software that
would screen for particular words. In short, nations can take significant
steps to prevent their citizens from being exposed to materials it considers
dangerous or offensive without exerting extraterritorial jurisdiction over
foreign content providers.
196. Geist, supra note 127.
197. Sussman, supra note 51.
198. Id.
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Thus, while new technologies challenge the autonomy of states they
can also be flipped to reinforce "information sovereignty." In areas such as
speech-where the perceived harm is one of visibility and the publisher is
unlikely to have dispersed assets-these approaches are particularly
apposite. Given that on-line content regulation is intended to reinforce
community integrity-the ability of communities to maintain the character
of their public spaces without being confronted with certain material-a
strategy of national self-regulation enables a more comprehensive and
immediate alternative to extraterritorial enforcement. In Yahoo!, for
example, a more effective and efficient strategy would be national filtering
at the ISP-level. Threatened with being blacklisted Yahoo! could then
chose to adapt its behavior if it valued access to French markets, while
France's public order would be protected regardless of its ability to
enforce its laws extraterritorially.
Foreign countries, then, have several less restrictive means of pro-
tecting their interests when it comes to speech that fall short of seeking
to directly regulate extraterritorial conduct. While nations have no obli-
gation to abide by such less restrictive means, considerations of what is
best for the international system recommend such approaches. The main
advantage such methods offer is for nations to maintain the integrity of
their own regulatory framework, without establishing undue and unnec-
essary burdens on competing sovereign entities.
C. Recalculating the Costs of Unilateral Action
Recognizing the inefficient and incomplete nature of the remedy of-
fered by the French decision in Yahoo!, French hate-speech activists
followed the Yahoo! suit by seeking an order in French court requiring
French ISP's to filter content from a U.S. hate speech portal,
Frontl4.org, a Internet content provider lacking the reputation or com-
mercial holdings of Yahoo!. '99 The portal hosts web sites for about 400
groups, some of which are European-based and post neo-Nazi, anti-
Semitic and racist content in European languages. International Action
for Justice (AIPJ), a French anti-racism group known as J'accuse, and
other such groups filed a lawsuit seeking to compel 13 French ISPs,
which include France Telecom and AOL France, to block the
Frontl4.org portal and the Web sites it hosts. However, Judge Jean-
Jacques Gomez, the same French judge who had earlier ordered Yahoo!
to adopt technology to comply with French law, refused to order French
ISP's to filter content from the portal. Faced with the claim from the
French ISPs that they should not be forced to act as on-line censors, the
199. Steve Kettmann, Another Hate Site Trial in France, WIRED, June 29, 2001.
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judge again weighed whether censorship was desirable and technically
feasible. However, having considered the technical and financial burdens
of ISP filtering, Judge Gomez denied the request.
While Judge Gomez was comfortable in imposing geographic fixes
upon Yahoo!, he chose not to order French businesses to absorb the cost
of filtering. In part, this can be explained, by the fact that France, like
other nations, has limited the liability of local ISPs. Viewing ISPs as
conduits rather than publishers themselves, the French court decided that
it was in the state's overall interest to not filter through intermediaries
because it would have a detrimental impact on the general accessibility
and provision of information, a conflicting aspect of French communica-
tions policy.
At some level, it may be said that this latter decision merits criti-
cism, to the extent that it lies in tension with the expressed desire of the
same court in Yahoo! to protect the French citizenry from culturally of-
fensive content. Perhaps more importantly, however, it demonstrates the
surprising difference in result that arises once the court was required to
assess the value for the French people of imposing technical measures
for compliance, as it was no longer able to rely upon the externalization
of this burden. Given this change in perspective, we must ask what al-
tered the court's measured assessment of the impact and importance of
the regulatory measures as well as their cost?200
The Frontl4.org case derived from a shift in litigation strategy,
originating in the perceived failure of direct unilateral regulation. The
plaintiffs understood that the court could not reach out to touch the pur-
veyors of hate speech nor could they rely on the publisher's desire to
abide by French law, in the absence of any distinct commercial interest
200. Recent reports about the use of the Internet in China and Iran make clear the
conflicting impulses that nations have regarding the integration of new communications
technologies. See Erik Eckholm.... And Click Here for China, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 4, 2002, Sec.
4, at 5; Nazila Fathi, Taboo Surfing: Click Here for Iran.... N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 4, 2002, Sec. 4,
at 5. These accounts demonstrate that even those states that have been traditionally been sensi-
tive to the intrusion of technology and open communications media are coming to accept the
Internet as a entryway to the world-for commercial and cultural practices. In keeping with a
history under Communism of information control, China was slow to permit its citizens to
access to the Internet, only doing so with governmentally imposed filtration of certain sites.
Yet, over time the Chinese government has loosened filtration and now given the proliferation
of online cafes and web bars, it far easier to gain casual access to the Internet in China than in
the U.S. Eckolm notes, "China is also desperate to catapult into modernity and be a key player
in a globalized world, and the government has invested huge sums to wire the country with
fiber optics and other advanced infrastructure." Eckholm, supra. Nazila Fathi offers a similar
assessment of the emergent role of the Internet in Iran, noting, ".. . there is also a pragmatic
recognition that the Internet holds a wealth of scientific and technological information, and
therefore promises progress. The trade-off is exposure to ideas and forums that run counter to
Iran's fundamentalist theocracy-a trade-off that the government, in spite of a few failed at-
tempts to filter Web sites and restrict access, seems resigned to make." Fathi, supra.
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in reaching French citizens. Yet, the refusal of the court to utilize, in the
alternative, indirect means of filtering suggests that it properly under-
stood that the evolution of state-based regulation in this context must
remain sensitive to the transmission of technological constraints beyond
a given dispute. Faced with the recursive and sweeping nature of a man-
dated techno-regulatory solution, the inherent appeal of a particular
technological fix dissipated. Forced to consider whether or not to fashion
virtual borders via national regulation from the inside-out, the French
court favored an opposing communications policy: access. It chose to
avoid the expansive costs imposed by the permanent imposition of legal
and financial burdens on the providers of France's communications in-
frastructure. Judge Gomez's reconsideration suggests that the desire for
states to remain an integral part of the global communications frame-
work and online marketplace may itself lead states to favor a more open
communications policy, even absent the embrace of a normative ideal of
international cooperation. From the perspective of those who favor a
network that privileges the free flow of information, this may serve as an
encouraging prospect.
The failure, however, to protect the interests of French citizens in
this instance may appear to return us to the technical and informational
hegemony of the United States. Yet, may I suggest, this conclusion arises
only if one takes a short-sighted and case-specific view of the online
regulations framework-a perspective rejected by the Frontl4.org deci-
sion. The ongoing technological enhancements of the global network
necessitates that all states, including the United States, begin to recon-
sider their relative regulatory needs more comprehensively. On balance,
as nations consider their needs outside specific judicial disputes, they
will be compelled to consider the difficulty of satisfying conflicting
goals in an interlocking dynamic system and will be less inclined to fa-
vor rigid technical constraints. They may be inclined then to take the
long view of a global communications framework and favor a perspec-
tive that sustains the network's identity as a cultural and commercial
entryway. In turn, they may be inclined to favor flexible and emergent
forms of cooperation and collective advancement.
CONCLUSION
Unilateral regulations of the Internet respond to and effectuate the
transition beyond the information architecture policy of the United States
and its free market bias. While legitimate as a response to local harm
originating abroad, unilateralism inevitably impacts the international
system and the development of the Internet as a shared global medium.
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The privileging of unilateral moves over more comprehensive and effec-
tive means of regional protection fails to recognize that "today's
international law is conceived of, if not always practiced as, the interna-
tional law of cooperation. [That this] is the alpha and omega ... of
general international law. 2 '0
The application of a principle of cooperation to cyberspace marks
the proper expansion of the tenets of international law as applied to a
distinctly international medium. A belief that international law may meet
this challenge can perhaps be derived from the similarities between the
international legal framework and the Internet itself. Like the Internet,
international law is spun from the convergence of shared norms and
rules-technical standards that help it operate. Like international law, the
Internet is driven by the benefits of and beset by the challenges of a
global coexistence. While a new medium, the Internet encourages the
application of old strategies and demands of us the implementation of
the underlying commitments and aspirations of the international legal
framework-if we desire to maintain the benefits of interdependence we
must work as one to forge workable solutions in support of our common
goals.
201. Dupuy, supra note 8, at 23.
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